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I. INTRODUCTION
Although most may assume the contrary,1 absent special circum-
stances, individuals have no right in their personal information.2  To-
day’s companies routinely collect data on online consumer behavior
and use that data for targeted advertising.  Web sites send cookies to
Web browsers that record not only our trips to the cookie-sending Web
site, but also subsequent visits to all other sites in our online travels.3
Meanwhile, Internet service providers install software directly on cus-
tomer computers or, in the case of “deep-packet inspection,” hardware
on our routing devices that tracks the online traffic coming in and out
of our homes.4  These technologies produce rich consumer profiles re-
vealing when, where, and who we travel with in the online world.  The
technologists then sell these profiles to third parties for the sole pur-
pose of beaming back personally tailored advertisements to our com-
puter screens.5  Although steps are taken to keep data collected online
anonymous, recent expose´s reveal how easy it is to extrapolate a par-
ticular identity from a few scraps of online data.6  Information
1. See JOSEPH TUROW ET AL., AMERICANS REJECT TAILORED ADVERTISING AND THREE
ACTIVITIES THAT ENABLE IT 4 (2009).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–44 (1976); see also Pa´tricia
Sanchez Abril, Private Ordering: A Contractual Approach to Online Interpersonal
Privacy, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 689, 702 (2010) (“[C]ourts have generally held
that one cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy in materials published
online.”); Jane B. Baron, Property as Control: The Case of Information, 18 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 367, 379 (2012) (“The law does not ensure that indi-
viduals will control the personal data collected about them.”); Ronald J. Krotos-
zynski Jr., The Polysemy of Privacy, 88 IND. L.J. 881, 885 (2013) (“[T]he
surreptitious collection of private information regarding web surfing habits, or
medical records, is generally legal.”).
3. Dustin D. Berger, Balancing Consumer Privacy with Behavioral Targeting, 27
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 3, 7–8 (2011); Neil M. Richards, The
Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1936–41 (2013).
4. Berger, supra note 3, at 11–13; Peter Whoriskey, Every Click You Make, WASH.
POST (Apr. 4, 2008), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2008-04-04/news/368547
06_1_web-sites-service-providers-consumer-data.
5. DANIEL J. SOLOVE ET AL., INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 623 (2d ed. 2006); Steven C.
Bennett, Regulating Online Behavioral Advertising, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 899,
901 (2011).
6. See Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure
of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010); Michael Barbaro & Tom Zeller
Jr., A Face is Exposed for AOL Searcher No. 4417749, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2006,
at A2; Bruce Schneier, Why ‘Anonymous’ Data Sometimes Isn’t, WIRED (Dec. 13,
2007), http://www.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2007/
12/securitymatters_1213.  In an example that should concern anyone paying for
health insurance, one researcher was able to unmask participants in an anony-
mous study of genetic information just by matching the participant’s birth date,
gender, and zip code with publicly available records.  Gina Kolata, Hunt for DNA
Sequences Leaves Privacy Compromised, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.
nytimes.com/2013/01/18/health/search-of-dna-sequences-reveals-full-identities.
html.
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profilers routinely fail to secure the online data they collect, poten-
tially subjecting consumers to online threats and identity theft as per-
sonal information falls into the wrong hands.7  Online tracking poses
real dangers, but the current legal and regulatory framework is
largely impotent to deal with them.
Revelation of these practices has galvanized public and political
opinion.8  A substantial majority of American consumers support
greater restrictions on and penalties for use of personal information
collected online.9  Recent legislative and regulatory initiatives call for
vigorous consumer protections against online data collection and mar-
keting.  The Federal Trade Commission recently requested “targeted
legislation” to provide greater control over the practices of information
brokers.10  Multiple bills are pending in Congress, including legisla-
tion setting mandatory timetables for the safe disposal of collected in-
formation,11 “Do Not Track Acts,” which would allow consumers to opt
7. Berger, supra note 3, at 21–22; Robert Sprague & Corey Ciocchetti, Preserving
Identities: Protecting Personal Identifying Information Through Enhanced Pri-
vacy Policies and Laws, 19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 91, 101–02 (2009).
8. The word “privacy” can mean many things.  Even when narrowed to its legal defi-
nition, the word can implicate the right to be free from unreasonable government
searches and seizures, the right to make certain essential human decisions with-
out government interference, or the right to have your home be free from certain
trespasses and surveillance.  In this Article, I am only interrogating one type of
privacy concern: control over personal information.
9. TUROW ET AL., supra note 1, at 3–4.  This holds true even for young adults who
grew up with the Internet. Id. at 16.  Moreover, even if the demographic data
were more mixed, I am not sure that we would want to simply wait for norms to
change to justify privacy intrusions.  To a large degree, the law, just by being
there, helps inform social norms.  Charles Fried argued long ago that privacy re-
quires a sense of personal security, and this sense can only be supplied by provid-
ing individuals with concrete legal protections.  Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE
L.J. 475, 493 (1968).  So as lawyers, as policymakers, and as business leaders, we
should think about what an appropriate safeguard of privacy would look like and
not just “react.”  It will be easier for technologists to embody appropriate norms
in code once we figure out what those norms are, and one way to do that is
through law.  Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 1125, 1169 (2000).
10. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE
iv (March 2012); see also Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy
on the Books and on the Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 289–90 (2011) (discussing
the FTC’s recent willingness to use its regulatory authority to prevent online
data collection and dissemination practices that are out of line with consumer
expectations).
11. Application Privacy, Protection, and Security Act, H.R. 1913, 113th Cong. (2013);
Data Accountability and Trust Act, H.R. 1841, 112th Cong. (2011); see also S.
501, 2013 Leg. (Cal. 2013)  (requiring social networking Web sites to remove per-
sonal identifying information upon request).  Relatedly, the European Union is
moving toward creation of a “right to be forgotten,” giving online subjects the
right to have their collected data erased. Commission Proposal for a Regulation
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals
with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such
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out of online data collection,12 and limitations on the solicitation and
gathering of online data from children.13  For citizens and legislators,
the question is not whether steps should be taken to enhance con-
sumer privacy, but how consumer privacy should be protected.
Despite the groundswell in favor of greater data privacy, there is a
real possibility that none of these legislative initiatives will succeed.
In reviewing new information privacy laws, courts will be faced with
the separate question of how to balance such protections with the
right to free expression.  This is because a company’s decision to col-
lect our personal data, share it with others, or repackage it into adver-
tisements can be labeled speech.  Various authorities, including the
United States Supreme Court, maintain that setting privacy limita-
tions on data sharing represents a government effort to censor expres-
sion.14  Although the party facing censorship is typically a corporation
using personal information for advertising purposes, commercial
speech enjoys constitutional protection15 regardless of the corporate
Data (General Data Protection Regulation), art. 16(1), at 33 (Jan. 25, 2012), avail-
able at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0010:
FIN:EN:PDF.
12. Do-Not-Track Online Act, S. 418, 113th Cong. (2013); Consumer Right to Finan-
cial Privacy Act, H.R. 2571, 113th Cong. (2013); Do Not Track Me Online Act,
H.R. 654, 112th Cong. (2011); see also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575 (West
2013) (requiring disclosure as to how a commercial Web site responds to a
browser’s “do not track” signals).
13. Do Not Track Kids Act, H.R. 1894, 112th Cong. (2011); see also S. 568, 2012–13
Leg. (Cal. 2013) (California bill requiring Web sites to permit minors to remove
posted content upon request).
14. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667 (2011); FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY
IN THE INFORMATION AGE 30 (1997) (describing privacy as “an antisocial construct
. . . [that] conflicts with other important values within the society, such as soci-
ety’s interest in facilitating free expression . . . .”); Jane Yakowitz Bambauer, Is
Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57 (2014); David Post, Cyberprivacy, or What I
(Still) Don’t Get, 20 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 249, 251 (2011) (“[O]ne per-
son’s privacy is very often another person’s infringement of the freedom to
speak.”); Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 390 (2008)
(“Indeed, when it comes to database regulation, many feel that any government
regulation of private information flows raises serious First Amendment issues.”).
These concerns over the free speech implications of data privacy apply to even the
most recent regulatory proposals.  As described by law professor Jeffrey Rosen,
“[Do Not Track] represents the biggest threat to free speech on the Internet in the
coming decade.”  Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. ON-
LINE 88, 88 (2012), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/online/
topics/64-SLRO-88.pdf.
15. In a number of cases, the Court has cited the public’s interest in the free ex-
change of information to prevent government regulation of advertising. E.g., Sor-
rell, 131 S. Ct. at 2670–71; Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374
(2002); Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977); Va. State Bd.
of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 769–70 (1976).
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status of the speaker.16  In short, laws protecting data privacy inevita-
bly need to be reconciled with the First Amendment.17  Under current
law, judges on the alert for threats to free expression and bound by
higher authority may believe they have little choice but to strangle
these fledgling efforts at online privacy in their cradle.
A recent case before the Supreme Court, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,
illustrates the problem.18  At issue was a Vermont law restricting
pharmaceutical marketers’ access to and use of prescription data for
advertising purposes.19  Pharmacies sold prescribing data to the mar-
keters, which resulted in targeted sales pitches to doctors.20  Vermont
banned the practice (with limited exceptions) unless a prescribing doc-
tor’s consent was obtained first.21  Vermont’s legislature passed the
law, in part, to protect “the privacy of prescribers and prescribing in-
formation.”22  Applying “heightened judicial scrutiny” to the law,23 the
Court struck it down as an unconstitutional burden on protected
speech under the First Amendment.24
Sorrell suggests broad recognition of the use of online information
as “speech.”25  The Court condemned the First Circuit, which had up-
held a similar state law, for characterizing the prescriber-identifying
information at issue “as a mere ‘commodity’ with no greater entitle-
ment to First Amendment protection than ‘beef jerky.’”26  Instead, the
16. Am. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012); Citizens United v.
FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899–900 (2010).  This makes some sense given that many
corporations are media organizations and nonprofit political advocacy organiza-
tions.  Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troub-
ling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 1049, 1083 (2000).  On the other hand, there is scholarly literature criticiz-
ing the equivalence between corporate and individual speech rights in the Court’s
jurisprudence. See, e.g., Tamara R. Piety, Against Freedom of Commercial Ex-
pression, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2583 (2008).
17. Bambauer, supra note 14, at 59–60.
18. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. 2653.
19. Id. at 2659.
20. Id. at 2659–60.
21. Id. at 2660.
22. Id. at 2681 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631(a)).
23. Id. at 2664 (majority opinion).
24. Id. at 2672.
25. There is some dispute over the effect of the Sorrell decision.  While some com-
mentators viewed it as a signal of defeat for privacy advocates, others suggested
that the Vermont statute’s unique characteristics limited the decision’s reach.
Compare Ashutosh Bhagwat, Sorrell v. IMS Health: Details, Detailing, and the
Death of Privacy, 36 VT. L. REV. 855 (2012) (speculating that Sorrell would pre-
empt forthcoming privacy regulation), with Agatha M. Cole, Note, Internet Adver-
tising After Sorrell v. IMS Health: A Discussion on Data Privacy and the First
Amendment, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 283, 304 (2012) (maintaining that the
Sorrell “decision was narrow and left much to be resolved”).
26. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2666 (quoting IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 52–53
(1st Cir. 2008)).
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Court explained, “the creation and dissemination of information are
speech within the meaning of the First Amendment.”27  Although Jus-
tices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kagan dissented, a six-judge majority, in-
cluding Justice Sotomayor, agreed that the government’s effort to
restrict use of personal prescribing information was an unconstitu-
tional abridgement of speech.  This suggests that a stable coalition on
the Court deems the use of collected consumer information as speech
protected under the First Amendment.  Hence, lower courts evaluat-
ing new information privacy laws (and the legislators drafting them)
will need to construe such laws as speech regulations and square them
with constitutional protections for free expression.28
Sorrell is just one case, and it may be able to be distinguished by
courts reviewing other information privacy laws.29  Because the Ver-
mont law forbid the use of prescription data for marketing, but not for
other purposes such as “educational communications,” the majority
deemed the speech restriction content-based and, hence, deserving of
particularly exacting First Amendment review.30  Another statute
might be more carefully drafted.  Even so, as it stands now, there is no
recognizable, effective jurisprudential mechanism for reconciling in-
formation privacy with free expression.31  The Sorrell decision offers
no guidance on how to determine when a state’s interest in consumer
privacy is sufficiently compelling to rebuff a First Amendment chal-
lenge.32  Before Sorrell, various privacy laws from the analog era were
subjected to First Amendment review.  Rather than representing a
balance of two competing interests, however, the Supreme Court
treated the First Amendment as an unyielding trump card for defend-
27. Id. at 2667.
28. Previous scholarship suggesting that dissemination of online data is not “speech”
for First Amendment purposes, see, e.g., Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Pri-
vacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1149 (2005), appears not to
have swayed the Court. See also CBS Interactive Inc. v. Nat’l Football League
Players Ass’n, Inc., 259 F.R.D. 398, 417–18 (D. Minn. 2009) (finding that the First
Amendment protects not only names and likenesses, but also “biographical
data”).
29. See Cole, supra note 25, at 305.
30. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2663–64.
31. Bambauer, supra note 14, at 71 (criticizing Sorrell decision for its lack of gui-
dance on how to balance speech and privacy); Jane Yakowitz Bambauer, The New
Intrusion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 205, 265 (2012) (“Scholars have struggled to
make sense of the public disclosure tort’s interaction with the First Amendment
for decades.”); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Details: Specific Facts and the First Amend-
ment, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 14 (2012) (“the privacy cases leave many unanswered
questions about the scope of protection for disclosure of private facts . . . .”);
Christina M. Gagnier, On Privacy: Liberty in the Digital Revolution, 11 J. HIGH
TECH. L. 229, 248 (2011).
32. Bambauer, supra note 14, at 71.
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ants.33  Repeatedly, the Court invalidated actions for common law pri-
vacy violations on free-speech grounds.34  Statutory privacy
protections exist as well but, like their common law cousins, no clear
paradigm for assessing their constitutionality has come to the fore.35
In sum, existing privacy law offers little guidance to a court trying to
balance free speech with information privacy.
As a result, judges seeking guidance need to turn to precedents
outside of privacy law.  As with legal restrictions on the use of online
data, intellectual property law necessarily bumps up against constitu-
tional safeguards for free expression.  Intellectual property laws, just
like proposed data privacy laws, prevent others from engaging in ex-
pressive activity and thereby implicate the First Amendment.  Laws
permitting authors to stop dissemination of infringing works, trade-
mark holders to block unauthorized use of their brands, and celebri-
ties to shut down traffic in their personas all proscribe speech.36
Unlike proposed data privacy laws, intellectual property law has been
on the books for decades.  The result has been a raft of judicial deci-
sions considering the proper balance of intellectual property rights
and free speech.
Studying the different ways in which intellectual property law ad-
dresses expressive concerns offers a variety of models for resolving the
33. Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1805,
1828–29 (2010); Neil M. Richards, The Limits of Tort Privacy, 9 J. TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. 357 (2011). See, e.g., Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533–37 (1989)
(holding the First Amendment barred liability for publishing name of rape victim
obtained from police report).
34. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (holding the First Amendment
prevented application of anti-wiretapping statute to media defendants); see Rich-
ards, supra note 14, at 388.
35. Bambauer, supra note 14, at 72 (“Very few cases have raised First Amendment
challenges to data privacy statutes.”); Bennett, supra note 5, at 931.  The overall
problem lies in the statutes’ narrow nature.  Most of the statutes were enacted
before the phenomenon of targeted online advertising took hold and only cover
specific regulated entities like hospitals and banks, not all online data users.
William McGeveran, Disclosure, Endorsement, and Identity in Social Marketing,
2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1105, 1138–39 (2009).  For example, the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 (codified in scattered sections
of 18, 29, and 42 U.S.C.) only applies to “covered entities” that do not include
most health-related Web sites or the data miners who provide consumer informa-
tion to such sites. Id. at 1139.  When asked to interpret existing privacy statutes
in a manner broad enough to encompass data miners and associated advertisers,
courts have balked. See In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 320 F.3d 9, 21 (1st
Cir. 2003); In re Doubleclick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 526
(S.D.N.Y. 2001).
36. Not only that, but such laws are likely content-based, thereby justifying particu-
larly searching First Amendment review.  Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian,
An Intersystemic View of Intellectual Property and Free Speech, 81 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1, 67–68 (2013); Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s
Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 5–6 (2002).
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impending conflict between data privacy and the First Amendment.
Yet intellectual property’s models for calibrating free-speech interests
have been ignored by courts and rejected by privacy scholars.  This
Article remedies that failure.  The Article begins in Part II by discuss-
ing the largely unexamined parallel between intellectual property
law’s treatment of expression-based defenses and the similar accom-
modations that will need to be incorporated into data privacy law.
Part II also addresses potential objections to modeling privacy law on
intellectual property.  Although there are some important conceptual
differences between intellectual property and privacy protections,
these differences are outweighed by their similarities, at least when it
comes to the specific issue of how to harmonize such protections with
expressive freedoms.
Parts III through V delineate the doctrinal mechanisms judges
have built into copyright, trademark, and publicity rights law for bal-
ancing the interests of intellectual property owners with free-speech
concerns.  Part III describes how intellectual property law deems par-
ticular categories of plaintiff communication to be worthy of protection
and unworthy of First Amendment privileges for unauthorized users.
Part IV notes how intellectual property law uses speaker intent as a
proxy for First Amendment interests.  Part V details specific doctrinal
mechanisms used to evaluate the expressive importance of an intellec-
tual property defendant’s speech contribution.  Parts III through V
also describe how courts could use these mechanisms to evaluate the
constitutionality of new data privacy laws.  By borrowing from intel-
lectual property, courts can respond to the current public demand for
restrictions on data use while still protecting the key expressive inter-
ests at the heart of the First Amendment.
II. DEFENDING THE IP LAW/PRIVACY LAW ANALOGY
Both information privacy and intellectual property implicate the
First Amendment.  Restrictions on the collection and use of personal
information limit speech.  By declaring certain expressive activities to
be infringing, intellectual property law does the same thing.  Years of
common law development have generated an extensive doctrinal ap-
paratus for addressing free-speech concerns.  As a result, intellectual
property law offers a potential template for courts struggling to bal-
ance new data privacy laws with the Constitution’s right to free
expression.
Nevertheless, many legal scholars reject comparisons between in-
tellectual property and information privacy law.  Instead, they pro-
pose mobilizing another legal regime—contract law—to balance
privacy and free speech concerns.  Given this scholarly backdrop, this
Article begins by making the case for analogizing intellectual property
to data privacy.  (Those already convinced of the salience of intellec-
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tual property law to data privacy issues can move ahead to Part III.)
This Part explains why the similarities between intellectual property
and information privacy, at least on the narrow issue of accommodat-
ing free speech, outweigh the differences.  It refutes the arguments of
intellectual property skeptics while also demonstrating contract law’s
inability to resolve the tension between data privacy and free speech.
A. Intellectual Property’s Relevance to Information Privacy
Just like privacy regulation, intellectual property law often finds
itself in tension with the First Amendment.  Copyright, trademark,
and publicity rights laws all limit communication by deeming a partic-
ular activity as infringing.37  Hence, just as privacy regulation for on-
line data use can be viewed as a government rule that prohibits some
speech, intellectual property law awards certain rights in expression
to one group while preventing others from using the same or similar
expression.
While sharing data privacy’s inherently speech-restrictive nature,
intellectual property offers specific doctrinal accommodations for ex-
pressive interests.  These accommodations possess two critical
strengths, which augur in favor of their export to the information pri-
vacy context.  First, intellectual property has a long history of balanc-
ing ownership rights with free speech.  New privacy law protections
are more likely to take root if they can be modeled on an existing area
of law.  Legal innovations enjoy greater acceptance if they appear
based in a longstanding legal tradition.38  Judges concerned with re-
versal from courts above may find more comfort in borrowing from an
established area of law than by creating a new body of legal doctrine
out of whole cloth.39  As a result, drawing a parallel to intellectual
property law’s doctrinal accommodations for free speech may stand a
better chance of success than other privacy law innovations.  These
accommodations boast a long pedigree, one that has typically been
validated when considered by the Supreme Court.40  Legitimacy con-
37. Although less discussed, patent and trade-secret protection also have the poten-
tial to silence speakers. See NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX
170 (2008); Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L. REV. 99, 142–45 (2000).
38. See Bambauer, The New Intrusion, supra note 31, at 229; Citron, supra note 33,
at 1835–36.  The history of proposed hate speech laws is instructive.  As docu-
mented by Anita Bernstein, proposed hate speech torts failed to win approval, in
part, because they appeared to be too much of a departure from tort law in gen-
eral and, relatedly, too inconsistent with traditional free speech doctrine.  Anita
Bernstein, How To Make a New Tort: Three Paradoxes, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1539,
1546, 1557 (1997).
39. Citron, supra note 33, at 1835–36; Melanie R. Kay, Environmental Negligence: A
Proposal for a New Cause of Action for the Forgotten Innocent Owners of Contami-
nated Land, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 149, 169 (2006).
40. E.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 890–91 (2012); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
186, 219–21 (2003); S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S.
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cerns may loom especially large in the data privacy context consider-
ing that new privacy regulations will compete with the
constitutionally protected right to free speech.
Second, intellectual property law is not monolithic: it addresses
free speech concerns in a variety of ways.  As detailed below, judges
and legislators trying to accommodate free expression while address-
ing privacy concerns have a menu of options to choose from if they
decide to borrow from intellectual-property jurisprudence.  This is a
strength, yet one that most privacy theorists do not acknowledge.41
Under these options, speakers can receive immunity from infringe-
ment suits by demonstrating certain kinds of speaker intent, a partic-
ular reshaping of existing expressive content, or that the speech’s
subject falls into a predetermined, favored category.  These defensive
options offer a rich template for calibrating expressive interests, a po-
tential improvement from the few simplistic and overly speech-protec-
tive precedents that currently set the boundary between information
privacy and free expression.
B. Answering the Intellectual Property Skeptics
Despite these strengths, many scholars reject analogies between
intellectual property and information privacy.  The scholars’ objec-
tions boil down to three concerns: differences in supply, underlying
rationales, and terminology.42
First, some skeptics maintain that any analogy between intellec-
tual property and data privacy is inapt because the former deals with
a problem of scarcity not found with the latter.  At root, intellectual
property rights are justified by the natural scarcity in intellectual
goods that would result if we allowed unrestrained market forces to
work their will.43  If creators lacked the ability to prevent unautho-
rized use of their works, they would no longer create with sufficient
frequency, and information products would be in too short supply.  To
522, 565 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (explaining that the descriptive fair-use
defense prevents trademark law from restricting an excessive amount of speech).
41. E.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 27 (2008) (stating general ob-
jection to extending intellectual property concepts to personal information);
Bambauer, The New Intrusion, supra note 31, at 222 (contending that the intel-
lectual property analogy is inapt because IP laws prohibit the propertization of
the “raw facts” that would be the target of data privacy laws).
42. Note that the perceived incompatibility of intellectual property and privacy regu-
lation is a particularly American view.  By contrast, in Europe, there has been a
greater willingness to construe both types of protection in similar terms. See Ar-
thur Rizer, Dog Fight: Did the International Battle over Airline Passenger Name
Records Enable the Christmas-Day Bomber?, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 77, 82 (2010).
43. See Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson, The Upside of Intellectual Prop-
erty’s Downside, 57 UCLA L. REV. 921, 922 n.2 (2010); Mark A. Lemley, The Eco-
nomics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 993
(1997).
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fix this problem, intellectual property law not only awards creators
the legal right to stop unauthorized uses, but it also makes these
rights freely alienable.44
Personal data, by contrast, is not in short supply.  Instead, our on-
line activities cause the continual generation of more and more per-
sonal information, whether we like it or not.45  Given the ever-
increasing amount of personal data revealed online, skeptics argue
there is no need to grant individuals an alienable right resembling an
intellectual property right to encourage the creation and dissemina-
tion of more of that data.46
The disjunction between intellectual property law’s efforts to stim-
ulate the creation and dissemination of new works and privacy law’s
contrasting efforts to restrict the flow of information should give us
pause.  Consumers do not need legal prompts to create more personal
data because life in a wired world does this for us already.  As a result,
some of intellectual property law’s provisions would be an ill fit for
information privacy concerns.47
44. See James Gibson, Once and Future Copyright, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 217
(2005).
45. Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Nathan Good, The Web Privacy Census, BERKELEY LAW
(Oct. 2012), http://law.berkeley.edu/privacycensus.htm (finding use of tracking
cookies on every one of the 100 most-visited online Web sites).  Even attempts to
cover one’s online tracks are likely to fail.  Online evidence of adultery forced the
resignation of CIA Director David Petraeus, even though Petraeus and his par-
amour were careful not to exchange emails, instead composing messages in an
electronic draft folder that could be checked by either party.  Donna Leinwand
Leger & Yamiche Alcindor, Petraeus and Broadwell Used Common E-mail Trick,
USA TODAY (Nov. 13, 2012, 9:40 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2012/
11/13/petraeus-broadwell-email/1702057/.
46. E.g., Mark A. Lemley, Private Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1545, 1550 (2000).
Others make a somewhat different argument, contending that, by giving individ-
uals a property right in their data modeled on intellectual property rights, the
law would force the commoditization of something that is inherently personal.
Baron, supra note 2, at 398.  Under this view, personal data should be quaran-
tined from marketplace forces, not traded like stocks and bonds.  Samuelson,
supra note 9, at 1138.
47. For example, copyright law allows a co-author of a copyrighted work to license
the work without the other co-author’s approval.  The licensor need only provide
her co-author with a proportional percentage of revenue secured by the license.
The reason for such a rule is to encourage distribution of copyrighted works to
society at-large. JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION
ECONOMY 122 n.5 (3d ed. 2010).  It would not make sense to adopt a parallel rule
for private information created jointly, perhaps by two individuals involved in an
intimate relationship. See Sonja R. West, The Story of Us: Resolving the Face-Off
Between Autobiographical Speech and Information Privacy, 67 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 589, 616–17 (2010).  Likewise, trademark law requires that a mark be used
in a public fashion before rights can attach.  Karl Storz Endoscopy-Am., Inc. v.
Surgical Techs., Inc., 285 F.3d 848, 855 (9th Cir. 2002).  A similar rule would not
make sense for personal data, which the data subject wants to keep private.
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Yet just because the commodity at issue in intellectual property
(creative output) is naturally scarce and the commodity at issue in in-
formational privacy (personal data) is naturally abundant does not
mean that the one legal regime has nothing to tell the other.  The mar-
kets for the subject of a legal entitlement may differ, but once the legal
entitlement has been established, lawmakers need to decide how to
construe that entitlement when it clashes with another legal protec-
tion.  Even after the initial entitlement is constructed, based on its
natural abundance or scarcity, defenses to that entitlement still need
to be built to take competing interests into account.48
Moreover, these defenses must be based on more than the scarcity
concerns that triggered the original entitlement.  Supreme Court pre-
cedent holds that content-based government regulation of speech war-
rants strict constitutional scrutiny regardless of the amount of speech
actually restricted.49  The interfaces developed to balance intellectual
property rights and speech incorporate a host of other normative
goals—autonomy interests, fairness concerns, opportunities for demo-
cratic participation—separate from the incentive-based rationales an-
imating much of the rest of copyright, trademark, and publicity-rights
law.50  Hence, it is the way that intellectual property law addresses
defenses based on free expression, not the way this law promotes the
initial creation and licensing of creative goods, that should be of most
interest to privacy scholars, particularly in the wake of the Sorrell
decision.
Second, some contend that intellectual property and privacy law
have little to tell each other because of their different theoretical un-
derpinnings.  Intellectual property is most often justified in utilitarian
terms.51  Copyright’s constitutional basis is the promotion of “useful
arts,” not the dignitary values of artists and inventors.52  Similarly,
modern trademark law is described instrumentally—it protects con-
sumers from inefficient searching and encourages business invest-
ments in product quality.53  Even the right of publicity, which blocks
unauthorized commercial uses of one’s persona, may be promoted as a
necessary tool to encourage the creation of captivating celebrity per-
sonas.54  In contrast, privacy regulation is typically justified in terms
48. See West, supra note 47, at 606 (contending that merely granting a right does not
tell lawmakers/courts how to resolve the tradeoff with other rights).
49. Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95–96 (1972).
50. See William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LE-
GAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001).
51. See Brett Frischmann & Mark P. McKenna, Intergenerational Progress, 2011
WIS. L. REV. 123, 129–30.
52. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
53. See Bertford Mfg., Inc. v. Smith Sys. Mfg. Corp., 419 F.3d 576, 579 (7th Cir.
2005).
54. Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 151 (3d Cir. 2013).
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of personal dignity and autonomy.55  Disclosure of personal informa-
tion against one’s will is often objected to because of the emotional
harm it inflicts on the data subject, not because of instrumental con-
cerns over the market for personal information.56  As a result, some
scholars suggest that importing the utilitarian intellectual property
framework to privacy law is an inappropriate use of economic regula-
tion to resolve questions of civil liberty.57
Again, these differences, while perhaps showing that privacy pro-
tections should not be exact replicas of intellectual property rights, do
not militate against studying the way intellectual property laws nego-
tiate the First Amendment.  In actuality, the theoretical bases for in-
tellectual property law are mixed.  It is simply not accurate to argue
that intellectual property’s purposes are antithetical to the goals of
privacy regulation.58  Although intellectual property tends to rely
more on utilitarian justifications than privacy law, it also routinely
draws on personhood theories.  The right of publicity is based, to a
large degree, on the argument that individuals naturally have a right
to control management of their personae.59  “Labor-dessert” theory,
which holds that individuals have an inherent right to enjoy the fruits
of their labors, plays a large role in copyright and trademark jurispru-
dence.60  For example, trademark dilution law seems largely justified
by a labor-dessert view that those who build up a brand name deserve
a legal shield from competing uses threatening to dim that brand’s
signaling power.61  Similarly, copyright law decisions frequently in-
55. HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEG-
RITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 81–84 (2010); Samuelson, supra note 9, at 1128.
56. M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131, 1133, 1142
(2011).  Some have made the case that failure to safeguard online privacy will
drive suspicious consumers away from the Internet. See Bennett, supra note 5,
at 906.  But this argument is much less prevalent than arguments based on au-
tonomy and dignitary concerns.
57. Samuelson, supra note 9, at 1143; West, supra note 47, at 615.  Another concern
is that using IP-style protections to protect an individual’s dignitary interest in
personal information will make intellectual property law as a whole more inco-
herent. See Samuelson, supra note 9, at 1140.
58. See Nita A. Farahany, Searching Secrets, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1239, 1255 (2012)
(arguing that copyright law seeks to vindicate privacy interests and, therefore,
should be employed as a metaphor for search-and-seizure law).
59. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 2:1 (2d ed. 2009);
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Preserving Personality and Reputational Interests of
Constructed Persons Through Moral Rights: A Blueprint for the Twenty-First
Century, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 151, 158–60; Mark P. McKenna, The Right of Pub-
licity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 225, 231 (2005).
60. See Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 NW. U. L. REV.
1441, 1447 (2010); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77
GEO. L.J. 287, 305 (1988).
61. Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, 109 MICH. L. REV. 137,
154 (2010).
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voke natural rights in assessing the scope of a particular copyright.62
Given that many of the theoretical bases behind intellectual property
mirror those advanced in favor of privacy protections, and intellectual
property law has developed several mechanisms for balancing the
rights of creators with the speech rights of downstream speakers, it
makes sense to look for potential lessons in this area of expression-
based defenses.
Finally, some object that because intellectual property law awards
“property” rights to individuals, it is not a good fit for the different
issues surrounding information privacy.63  Those holding this position
maintain that property rights must have explicit boundaries and that
privacy is too broad of a subject to be confined within the property
box.64  Intellectual property can accommodate free speech in its par-
ticular fashion, the argument goes, because there are well-defined
contours to intellectual property rights that can be pitted against ex-
pressive concerns.  The same accommodations would not work for pri-
vacy regulation, however, as privacy’s vague boundaries would chill
an excessive amount of speech by commercial actors who cannot deter-
mine where privacy begins or ends.65
It is true that privacy is notoriously hard to define.  Robert Post
once lamented, “Privacy is a value so complex, so entangled in compet-
ing and contradictory dimensions, so engorged with various and dis-
tinct meanings, that I sometimes despair whether it can be usefully
addressed at all.”66  Yet, as with the other critiques, this objection
should not forestall examination of the way intellectual property law
balances free speech.  Although it is true that the term “privacy” is
subject to multiple definitions, privacy’s contours become more obvi-
ous when we focus on a particular legal entitlement in personal infor-
mation.  This Article leaves aside the two most familiar areas of
privacy regulation: the decisional privacy rights used to justify inti-
mate personal choices like the right to elect to have an abortion and
residential privacy rights that protect against government intrusions
in the home.  Instead, the particular question addressed here is how to
balance restrictions on the collection and dissemination of online con-
sumer data with rights in free expression.  Narrowing the focus to on-
62. See JOHN TEHRANIAN, INFRINGEMENT NATION: COPYRIGHT 2.0 AND YOU 38 (2011);
Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individual-
ism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1548–49
(1993).
63. See Bambauer, The New Intrusion, supra note 31, at 231.
64. West, supra note 47, at 615.
65. Volokh, supra note 16, at 1116; see also Harry Kalven Jr., Privacy in Tort Law—
Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 327 (1966)
(criticizing privacy as a “less precise way of approaching more specific values”
like freedom of speech).
66. Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2087 (2001).
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line uses of personal information brings a potential right in data
privacy into a sharper, more definable focus, thereby alleviating some
concerns over the fuzzy contours of “privacy,” as that term is popularly
used.
In addition, we should recognize that intellectual property rights
are not always known for their crystal-clear boundaries.  For example,
legal entitlement to copyright is dependent on a judicial determina-
tion that the work at issue is an expression rather than an idea.67
This is a notoriously hazy distinction that can be impossible for cre-
ators to assess ex ante.68  Similarly, the scope of someone’s right in a
particular trademarked term depends on judicial evaluation of the
likelihood of consumer confusion, an infamously fluid and unpredict-
able appraisal.69  Instead of throwing up their hands at intellectual
property’s vagaries, courts have stepped in to announce principles for
reconciling these admittedly indefinite rights with the competing
right to free expression.  Hence, the argument that intellectual prop-
erty has clear boundaries and, therefore, can be conceptualized as
“property” while online privacy rights are unknowable and unwork-
able under the property rubric is unconvincing.70  Once some protec-
tion for data privacy has been established (whether it is characterized
as a “property” right or not), we are still left with the question of how
to balance that protection with free speech concerns.71
67. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) (stating that copyright protection does not extend to
ideas).
68. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930); Rubenfeld,
supra note 36, at 14.
69. See Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721, 761–64
(2004); Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark
Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 1583–84 (2006).
70. In broader terms, we should not be overly influenced by the word “property” and
somehow assume that every facet of a system of property rules is incompatible
with a system of liability rules.  The description of intellectual property rights as
“property” does not prevent a comparison with any other legal protection that
does not have the word “property” stamped on it.  The distinction between prop-
erty and nonproperty legal regimes can be a bit of a red herring.  As Bill
McGeveran points out, any legal protection or restriction can be construed as a
“property” right.  McGeveran, supra note 35, at 1163; see also Jane B. Baron, The
Contested Commitments of Property, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 917 (2010) (suggesting
academics have largely ignored questions about property’s stability over time and
“its very status as a distinctive field of study”).
71. The explicit recognition of intellectual property in the Constitution does not make
the way intellectual property negotiates the First Amendment somehow inappli-
cable to the data privacy-free speech interface.  Although information privacy is
not explicitly recognized in the Constitution, neither is trademark protection or
the right of publicity.
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C. The Insufficiency of Contract
One final development in the recent information privacy scholar-
ship deserves mention.  A number of legal scholars have concluded
that the free-speech/privacy conflict can be best managed through pri-
vate ordering.72  Consumers that resent the liberties taken by online
providers with their personal data simply need to negotiate contrac-
tual terms that will provide them greater control.  Perhaps the most
appealing aspect of a contractual approach is that it promises to pro-
tect privacy while avoiding First Amendment challenges.  In the Su-
preme Court’s free speech jurisprudence, there is little concern with
individuals giving up their speech rights via contract.  The Court has
been clear: contracts not to speak are constitutional.73  As First
Amendment scholar Eugene Volokh notes, “The great free speech ad-
vantage of the contract model is that it does not endorse any right to
‘stop people from speaking about me.’  Rather, it endorses a right to
‘stop people from violating their promises to me.’”74
Unfortunately, problems with the contractual approach outweigh
its merits.  Contract can only play a limited role in reconciling free
speech with increased data privacy given the structural power imbal-
ance between individual consumers and data users, cognitive difficul-
ties inherent in making privacy choices, and contract law’s particular
legal limitations.
A close look at the dynamics of online commerce and communica-
tion reveals serious flaws in the market between data subjects and
users for better privacy terms.  Consumers face collective action
problems in attempting to push online providers into offering more
protective terms of service.75  Part of the problem is that individual
harm from data misuse is usually minimal, thereby making it unlikely
that large groups of online consumers will band together to negotiate
better terms of service.  Moreover, data misuse often occurs without
consumer awareness.76  As a result, online entities may be concerned
with their corporate reputations, but they also appear somewhat im-
mune to public backlash over their use of personal data.  For example,
72. See, e.g., McGeveran, supra note 35, at 1158; Samuelson, supra note 9, at 1171;
Volokh, supra note 16, at 1057–61; see also In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site
Data, 724 F.3d 600, 614–615 (5th Cir. 2013) (finding no constitutional barrier to
government acquisition of cellphone location data and urging consumers to find a
“market” solution to their privacy needs); M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepti-
cism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027 (2012) (exploring
use of “visceral notice” to address online privacy concerns).
73. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991); see also Abril, supra note 2, at
708 (noting that the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld self-imposed speech
restrictions, even when the information is of legitimate public concern).
74. Volokh, supra note 16, at 1061.
75. Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 10, at 254.
76. Cole, supra note 25, at 287–88.
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despite being viewed in many circles as a privacy scofflaw,77 Facebook
enjoyed a historic initial public offering, reaching a peak market capi-
talization of $104 billion, and currently has 1.11 billion subscribers.78
Most online providers typically confront their data subjects with a
one-size-fits-all offer: give up your personal information or forego the
proffered online services.79  Given the importance of online participa-
tion, both socially and economically in modern life, it is unrealistic to
expect consumers to choose the latter option.80
Even without these structural barriers, consumers would still have
trouble evaluating proposed privacy terms.  A consumer agreeing to
disclose personal information has little sense as to the universe of
third parties likely to also have access to this information.81  Consum-
ers understand that their own disclosure might result in a particular
item of data being used by the Web site they make the disclosure to.
But they have no way of knowing when their personal data, perhaps
voluntarily offered to one business, has been passed along to the busi-
ness’s other divisions or subcontractors,82 or, even more disturbing
from a privacy perspective, sold to unknown entities, which may have
a very different purpose and corporate philosophy than the business to
77. Charlie Warzel, For Privacy, Americans Trust Facebook Less Than the NSA,
BUZZFEED (Sept. 12, 2013, 4:15 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/charliewarzel/sur-
vey-for-privacy-americans-trust-facebook-less-than-the-ns (discussing recent sur-
vey showing that 61 percent of respondents “do not trust Facebook at all” to
protect their personal information and privacy, a poorer showing than other enti-
ties such as Google, the Internal Revenue Service, and the National Security
Agency).
78. Josh Constine, Facebook’s Growth Since IPO in 12 Big Numbers, TECHCRUNCH
(May 17, 2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/05/17/facebook-growth/; Lee Spears &
Sarah Frier, Facebook Set for Public Debut After IPO Seals $104 Billion Value,
BLOOMBERG.COM (May 18, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-18/
facebook-set-for-public-debut-after-ipo-seals-104-billion-value.html.
79. McGeveran, supra note 35, at 1126; West, supra note 47, at 611.  Some maintain
that the unilateral nature of online contracting can be changed, thereby provid-
ing consumers with more control over their data and alleviating concerns over
government restrictions on how consumer data is used.  Two scholars propose a
privacy-contracting regime akin to the Creative Commons model used to facili-
tate licensing of copyrighted works. See Abril, supra note 2, at 722; Shubha
Ghosh, Informing and Reforming the Marketplace of Ideas: The Public–Private
Model for Data Production and the First Amendment, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 653,
703–05.  But other problems with the market for online terms make this unlikely.
First, private ordering is more plausible in the IP context because data subjects
face a more coercive, less robust bargaining process than holders of intellectual
property.  Second, consumers face particular cognitive difficulties when attempt-
ing to bargain for greater privacy.  These difficulties may cause them to overlook
or even reject contractually available privacy safeguards. See infra notes 83–91
and accompanying text.
80. See McGeveran, supra note 35, at 1127.
81. TUROW ET AL., supra note 1.
82. Bennett, supra note 5, at 937; see also Berger, supra note 3, at 22 (maintaining
that such sharing among corporate partners and contractors is routine).
2014] INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY’S LESSONS 763
which they made the original disclosure.83  In the ecology of the Web,
thousands of unrelated Web sites all participate and share data in a
single advertising network.84  Survey evidence shows that consumers
do not know that businesses track a person’s entire online history as
opposed to just their transactions with one particular Web site.85
They do not realize that disclosures of data to different Web sites can
be combined to develop robust profiles sometimes so precise so as to
remove the cloak of consumer anonymity.86  Most online shoppers
would be shocked to discover that retailers like Target and Amazon
combine myriad bits of online data from thousands of sources to iden-
tify and predict the intimate details of their customers’ lives, such as
their reading habits or an undisclosed pregnancy, all in an effort to
make their sales pitches more effective.87
Greater transparency will not resolve these problems.  Cognitive
biases skew assessments of the costs and benefits of greater privacy
protection.  Even with more disclosure of where data goes and how it
is used, consumers cannot accurately assess (1) the risk of loss of per-
sonal information from participating in behavioral targeting (i.e. data
breaches); and (2) the magnitude of potential harms from such a
loss.88  Optimism bias tends to cause consumers to go for the immedi-
ate reward of an online transaction rather than looking for alterna-
tives with better privacy terms.  We want more privacy but are
unwilling to delay gratification in order to get it.  At the same time, we
minimize the costs of future harms from privacy violations.89  Thanks
to these cognitive handicaps, even highly motivated consumers acci-
dentally trigger undesired privacy settings when they navigate online
interfaces.90  Studies demonstrate that the mere existence of a privacy
83. Calo, supra note 56, at 1133–35; Ohm, supra note 6.
84. Berger, supra note 3, at 8; Richards, supra note 3, at 1938–40.
85. Calo, supra note 56, at 1149; H. Brian Holland, Privacy Paradox 2.0, 19 WIDENER
L.J. 893, 899 (2010).
86. SOLOVE, supra note 41, at 118; Bennett, supra note 5, at 905; Berger, supra note
3, at 4; Calo, supra note 56, at 1149; Steve Lohr, How Privacy Vanishes Online,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/17/
technology/17privacy.html?_r=1&.
87. Neil M. Richards, The Perils of Social Reading, 101 GEO. L.J. 689, 698–99 (2013);
Charles Duhigg, Psst, You in Aisle 5, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 12, 2012, at § 6, at
30.
88. Berger, supra note 3, at 24; Holland, supra note 85, at 897, 907; see also Daniel J.
Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information
Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1452 (2001) (contending that consumers fre-
quently lack the ability to assign the proper value to their personal information).
89. Calo, supra note 56, at 1149 n.106 (arguing that consumers sell their data too
often and too cheaply because of “privacy myopia”); Holland, supra note 85, at
903 (citing evidence of human difficulty in forecasting long-term risks).
90. Berger, supra note 3, at 28; Gagnier, supra note 31, at 251–52.
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policy, regardless of its actual contents, tends to increase consumer
disclosure.91
Finally, contract law itself imposes several impediments on those
seeking greater privacy protection.  Contractual protections only ap-
ply to the original transacting parties.92  Because the nature of online
data collection and sharing typically involves the collection of data by
one party and its use by another party, consumers relying on contract
would often be left with no recourse against the actual data user.93
Another shortcoming relates to the nature of contract damages.  The
majority of undesired online disclosures yield minimal, intangible
harms.  In the aggregate, these harms produce significant social
costs,94 but considered individually, they are harms that contract law
91. Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Jennifer King, What Californians Understand About Pri-
vacy Online (Sept. 3, 2008) (unpublished article), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1262130; Holland, supra note 85, at 899; see
also Somini Sengupta, Letting Down Our Guard with Web Privacy, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 30, 2013 (discussing academic research revealing inability of consumers to
understand online privacy policies).  The calculation required of online consum-
ers assessing privacy policies is arguably more difficult than the challenge of
evaluating the benefits of a bargain faced by a copyright holder.  An artist giving
up rights in her work may not know exactly how it will be used, but the basic
contours of the work are self-evident.  Music is meant to be listened to, books are
meant to be read, sculptures are meant to be put on display and visually appreci-
ated.  Even if someone not part of the original contract between creator and buyer
ends up with the work, the probable use by the ultimate possessor of the copy-
right is relatively clear.  There are of course exceptions, but even an artist who
would rather not have her work used in a particular fashion (e.g., as an advertise-
ment for a product that is personally unappealing to the artist) knows that she
runs this risk by assigning her copyright to someone else.  An online shopper,
however, has very little sense of who will ultimately review her personal data or
for what purpose.
92. Abril, supra note 2, at 715.
93. Suggestions have been made to remedy this contract law shortcoming by impos-
ing an additional “duty of confidentiality” on third parties that use personal data.
See Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil Lia-
bility, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1650, 1667 (2009).  Yet under American law, duties of
confidentiality can only apply to parties in an existing relationship.  Citron, supra
note 33, at 1850.  In addition, even when a confidential relationship exists, if the
information at issue comes to be possessed by a third party, the individual can no
longer claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information. SOLOVE,
supra note 41, at 139.  In other words, a duty of confidentiality might be imposed
on the original Web site that took your information, but not on the data broker
who purchased and used your information.  Moreover, if the data at issue be-
comes known to anyone else and the original Web site is not responsible for the
initial dissemination, the Web site cannot be liable for breach of confidentiality.
See id. at 139–40.
94. See SOLOVE, supra note 41, at 132 (discussing how the potential for unforeseen
uses of personal data “generates fear and uncertainty over how one’s information
will be used in the future, creating a sense of powerlessness and vulnerability”);
Calo, supra note 56, at 1142 (arguing that the mere perception of being observed
online can cause significant psychological harm).
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currently refuses to recognize.95  Hence, consumers might find them-
selves with a contractual right to prevent privacy violations but lack-
ing sufficient proof of damages to actually exercise that right.96  In
addition, contractual privacy solutions still implicate free expression.
Contracts designed to ensure privacy can chill speech.  Parties might
enter into an agreement not to disclose certain sensitive personal de-
tails, but outside disclosure of these details could also be in the public
interest depending on the nature of the information and how it was to
be used.97  A contractual legal regime allowing too much restriction on
the sharing of data could impoverish the discourse.98
Given these problems, contract law cannot resolve the tension be-
tween enhanced data privacy and free speech.99  Instead, additional
95. Abril, supra note 2, at 706–07; see also SOLOVE, supra note 41, at 127–28 (discuss-
ing judicial reluctance to recognize data “insecurity” as a legally cognizable
problem).
96. Another problem with a contractual solution is that it would likely increase the
complexity of the marketplace for privacy, thereby compounding the cognitive
challenges faced by concerned consumers.  As Jane Baron has noted, one of the
strengths of property law is its use of strong, relatively crude signals to create
social ordering.  Baron, supra note 2, at 388; see also Thomas W. Merrill & Henry
E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1849 (2007) (arguing
any property system must have an element of moral significance in order to sur-
vive).  The law of trespass is a blunt tool, but people know what it means.  By
contrast, a regime made up of millions of individual contracts tailored to each
consumer’s unique privacy preferences increases the costs of online commerce, as
well as the costs of governing, when entities, unknowingly or not, commit an in-
fraction.  Baron, supra note 2, at 388.  Too much individual privacy tailoring
poses insurmountable challenges for contract law.  Basing privacy protection on
personal preferences would create an unstable legal environment, ultimately
harming both data subjects and data users. SOLOVE, supra note 41, at 70.
97. See Andrew J. McClurg, Kiss and Tell: Protecting Intimate Relationship Privacy
Through Implied Contracts of Confidentiality, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 887, 908 (2006).
For example, evidence shows that restrictions on the disclosure of patient medi-
cal records can hamstring medical research, delaying the discovery and removal
of dangerous drugs from the marketplace. See Barbara J. Evans, Seven Pillars of
a New Evidentiary Paradigm: The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Enters the Geno-
mic Era, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 419, 456 (2009).
98. This is not to say that contract has no role to play in addressing privacy concerns.
Intellectual property law diagnoses situations where increased formalities are
meant to improve the bargaining process.  For example, assignment of a copy-
right cannot be oral.  It has to be in writing.  17 U.S.C. § 204 (2006).  The same is
true of trademark assignments.  15 U.S.C. § 1060(a)(3) (2012).  When asked to
relax these rules based on industry custom or an analysis on the subjective mind-
set of the contracting parties, courts have balked. E.g., Effects Assocs., Inc. v.
Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 557 (9th Cir. 1990); MVP Entm’t Inc. v. Frost, 149 Cal. Rpt.
3d 162, 164–66 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012).  Similar formalities may need to be legis-
lated in online privacy contracts to put consumers and data users on a more equal
footing.
99. See James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1178–87
(2009) (contending that efforts to improve Facebook’s disclosure policies will be
ineffective in resolving privacy concerns).
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regulatory responses and doctrinal accommodations will be needed.
As discussed below, intellectual property law offers different models
for balancing privacy with free speech.  One approach focuses on the
plaintiff’s speech subject.  Instead of analyzing what the defendant
has done with the plaintiff’s materials, the court must categorize the
intellectual property holder’s expressive project and render a decision
as to the defendant’s free speech rights on that basis.  Another ap-
proach focuses on the defendant’s intent, using evidence of motive to
divide infringing use from permissible expression.  A final method as-
says the expressive potential of the defendant’s speech, leaving ques-
tions about the defendant’s intent or subject of the plaintiff’s original
expression largely to the side.  Parts III–V investigate the soundness
of each of these models and discuss how they can be implemented in a
combined fashion to bridge the privacy/free speech divide.
III. FREE SPEECH AND SUBJECT MATTER
One potential starting point in weighing expressive rights against
other interests is to focus on the expression’s subject.  The thought
behind such an approach is that some subjects of communication are
more critical to the goals behind the First Amendment than others.
Courts trying to achieve a balance between intellectual property
rights and free expression have built doctrines that weigh free speech
defenses by categorizing the subject of the original communication.
This Part describes these doctrines, as well as their potential applica-
tion to the privacy/free speech divide.
A. Copyright’s Focus on Speech Subject
To some degree, all intellectual property regimes employ free
speech safeguards based on the intellectual property holder’s speech
subject.  For example, the type of trademark held by the plaintiff is
relevant to building a case for trademark infringement, which re-
quires a showing of “likelihood of confusion.”100  Under established
doctrine, those holding a more distinctive or unique mark (e.g., Apple
for computers) have an easier time demonstrating infringement than
those holding a less distinctive mark (e.g., eMachines for com-
puters).101  Hence, built in to the fabric of trademark law is a pre-
sumption against trademark protection for words considered critical
to downstream expression.
100. See, e.g., Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., 618 F.3d
1025, 1030 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that likelihood of confusion is the “core ele-
ment of trademark infringement”).
101. Courts routinely assess “mark strength” in the likelihood of confusion analysis,
investigating the degree of both inherent distinctiveness and acquired market-
place distinctiveness a mark possesses. E.g., Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Nawab, 335
F.3d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 2003).
2014] INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY’S LESSONS 767
In a parallel manner, the type of celebrity at issue can impact the
success of a right of publicity claim.  The right of publicity gives indi-
viduals a right to block unauthorized commercial uses of their per-
sonas.  Given the importance of celebrities to daily discourse, serious
free speech concerns are raised by the right.  As a result, both courts
and legislatures have created defenses immunizing some journalistic
uses of celebrity names or images.  Some courts evaluating “new-
sworthiness” defenses to right of publicity claims ask whether the sub-
ject of the defendant’s expression was of “public concern.”102  If so, the
subject’s publicity interests must be sacrificed to the First Amend-
ment.  For example, given his prominence in popular culture, one
court deemed stories of Clint Eastwood’s romantic dalliances a matter
of “public concern.”103  At least one state right-of-publicity law draws
a distinction between appropriation of a famous personality and ap-
propriation of a persona without commercial value.104  Persons falling
into the latter category enjoy a much more limited scope of protection
and, hence, must submit to more unauthorized uses.105
The categorization approach is most evident in copyright law.  The
primary accommodations copyright law makes for free speech involve
categorization of the plaintiff’s work.  Less attention is paid to what
the defendant actually does with that plaintiff’s work.  When the
plaintiff’s communication falls into a disfavored category identified
with free speech interests (ideas, raw facts, or “scenes-a-faire”), copy-
right’s expressive defenses pack their greatest punch.  When the
plaintiff’s communication falls into a favored subject category viewed
as less essential to downstream expression (e.g., fictional works), free
speech concerns recede.  Copyright law does this through two particu-
lar judicial innovations: (1) the idea/expression dichotomy; and (2) the
fair-use defense.  According to the Supreme Court, their existence ex-
102. E.g., Raymen v. United Senior Ass’n, 409 F. Supp. 2d 15, 23 (D.D.C. 2006); Joe
Dickerson & Assocs., LLC v. Dittmar, 34 P.3d 995, 1003 (Colo. 2001).  On the
other hand, courts largely ignore the type of trademark at issue when determin-
ing a defendant’s eligibility for any of trademark’s three affirmative defenses to
infringement.  This omission is particularly striking given the obvious free speech
concerns at stake in granting trademark rights in a merely descriptive trade-
mark. See generally Lisa P. Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks and the First
Amendment, 70 TENN. L. REV. 1095 (2003).
103. Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 423 (1983).
104. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 63.60.020, 63.60.040 (2012).
105. Id.  But under most analyses, the prominence of the celebrity persona is not spe-
cifically acknowledged in deciding how to balance First Amendment concerns
with the right of publicity.  Instead, to state a claim under the right of publicity, a
plaintiff must merely show the defendant’s unauthorized use of her identity and
resulting injury.  Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1069 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
As we will see, instead of categorizing the plaintiff’s expression, in the main, pub-
licity rights law relies on very different mechanisms to accommodate free speech
interests. See infra Part V.
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empts copyright law from the more searching judicial review one
might expect for government regulation of expression.106
For our purposes, two points regarding these measures bear em-
phasis.  First, courts largely examine the kind of communication cre-
ated by the plaintiff, not the defendant’s use of that communication.
Under the idea/expression dichotomy, an author can be awarded a
property right in a particular expression (thereby preventing other
speech) but not in the idea behind the expression.  The thought behind
this copyright principle is that ideas are too valuable to be monopo-
lized by one party.  Instead, they remain in the public domain as
building blocks for other creations.107  Courts apply the dichotomy by
placing the communication that the plaintiff is trying to protect in one
of two categories: “idea” or “expression.”
Over time, courts have attached additional speech protective mech-
anisms onto the idea/expression edifice.  Again, these mechanisms re-
quire categorization of the plaintiff’s speech.  Copyright law’s merger
doctrine reasons that when the plaintiff’s subject matter is susceptible
to only one or a limited number of possible expressions, the subject
matter may not be copyrighted.108  This is another judicial mechanism
for accommodating First Amendment principles and, again, the focus
is on the plaintiff’s work, not the defendant’s use of that work.109
Similarly, judges have created the scenes-a-faire doctrine, which
allows others to borrow stock characters, themes, and scenic elements
from a copyrighted work in order to portray a particular time and
place.110  Unlike the merger doctrine, the scenes-a-faire doctrine does
not involve an expression that is impossible to separate from its un-
derlying idea.  Rather, it takes certain dramatic conventions employed
by the plaintiff and removes them from copyright protection to further
expressive interests.111  For example, particular plot details in a ro-
106. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 890–91 (2012); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,
221 (2003); Harper & Row, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985); see
also Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 893 (9th Cir. 2005)
(describing the dichotomy as a “major First Amendment protection”); Neil Wein-
stock Natanel, First Amendment Constraints on Copyright After Golan v. Holder,
60 UCLA L. REV. 1082, 1086 (2013) (“First Amendment scrutiny of copyright law
is unwarranted so long as the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use privilege
. . . remain ‘undisturbed.’” (quoting Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 890–91
(2012))).
107. E.g., Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 978–89 (2d Cir.
1980).
108. E.g., Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 679 (1st Cir. 1967) (grant-
ing summary judgment for defendant because of limited number of ways to ex-
press sweepstakes rules).
109. Pamela Samuelson, Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Historical Perspec-
tive, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 319, 320 n.6 (2003).
110. E.g., Benay v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 607 F.3d 620, 624–25 (9th Cir. 2010);
Hoehling, 618 F.2d at 979.
111. 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 4:28 (2012).
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mance novel—a husband and wife endure a miscarriage, separate, re-
unite, rediscover their love for each other, and, in the end, expect
another child—are too “standard” in the romance novel genre to enjoy
copyright protection.112  Although judges first applied the scenes-a-
faire doctrine in the context of dramatic works, they have since ex-
panded it to protect all manner of speech, including computer code.113
As with the idea/expression dichotomy, courts examine the plaintiff’s
communication to determine whether it falls into the category of an
unprotectable scene-a-faire.
Copyright’s fair-use defense also trains its attention on the plain-
tiff’s speech subject.  As affirmed by the Supreme Court, “the nature of
the interest at stake is highly relevant to whether a given use is
fair.”114  The defense requires a court to interrogate four factors:
• the purpose and character of the use;
• the nature of the original work;
• the amount and substantiality of the original work taken;
• the market harm to the original.115
Three of the four fair-use factors focus on what has been borrowed
from the original rather than on the use made by the infringer.
Hence, the second factor asks a court to examine “the nature of the
original work.”  According to the Supreme Court, “This factor calls for
recognition that some works are closer to the core of intended copy-
right protection than others.”116
The third and fourth factors also require an analysis of the original
communication.  The third factor assesses the amount and substanti-
ality of the original work taken.117  For this factor, a court must ana-
lyze the substantiality of the taking from the perspective of the
plaintiff’s work, not the defendant’s.118  To wit, in one case applying
this factor, it did not matter that the material copied from a book on
sales techniques comprised only a small fraction of the ultimate work
112. Rucker v. Harlequin Enters., No. 4:12-cv-01135, 2013 WL 707922 (S.D. Tex. Feb.
26, 2013).
113. 2 PATRY, supra note 111, at § 4:26; Computer Associates Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.,
982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
114. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 552–54 (1985).
115. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).  If anything, the fair-use defense looms even larger in the
judicial imagination as a surrogate for First Amendment concerns than the idea/
expression dichotomy.  As stated by the Second Circuit, “absent extraordinary
circumstances, ‘the fair use doctrine encompasses all claims of first amendment
in the copyright field.’”  Sarl Louis Feraud Int’l v. Viewfinder, Inc., 489 F.3d 474,
482 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d
1366, 1378 (2d Cir.1993)).
116. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994).
117. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2012).
118. Peter Letterese & Assocs. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., 533 F.3d 1287,
1314–15 (11th Cir. 2008); NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 480 (2d Cir.
2004).
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created by the defendant.119  What was important, in evaluating the
third factor, was the amount of material taken from the original.120
As explained by the Supreme Court in an earlier case interpreting the
third factor, “[A] taking may not be excused merely because it is in-
substantial with respect to the infringing work.”121
The fourth factor requires the court to determine the amount of
market harm to the original.  In evaluating this factor, courts inquire
as to the worth of the original, as well as potential future derivative
works that could be made from the original.  Plaintiffs profit when
they can show an effect on a market they are exploiting, thinking
about exploiting, or could potentially exploit for their work.122  Exter-
nal benefits to parties other than the plaintiff are not considered in
the fourth factor.
This is not to say that the defendant’s behavior has no bearing on
copyright fair use.  Some comparison of the defendant’s work to the
plaintiff’s work is necessary to assess the third and fourth factors.
Moreover, as described below, the first fair-use factor engages directly
with the defendant’s work itself by analyzing its “purpose and charac-
ter.”123  In general, however, the fair-use analysis represents an effort
to categorize the plaintiff’s original communication and its importance
to downstream expression.  In applying factors two through four,
courts scrutinize the plaintiff’s work to evaluate the strength of the
defendant’s speech interest.
The second notable characteristic of copyright’s two main expres-
sive defenses is that they privilege the use of factual information by
others.  In describing the idea/expression dichotomy, courts sometimes
equate ideas with “facts” or “discoveries.”124  For example, when copy-
right was asserted in model building codes that had been subse-
quently adopted by two municipalities, a Web site operator that
posted the codes raised the idea/expression dichotomy as a defense to
infringement.125  The Fifth Circuit recognized the defense, holding
that the codes were “facts” and, therefore, not copyrightable.126  The
119. Letterese & Assocs., 533 F.3d at 1314–15.
120. Id.
121. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 565 (1985).
122. E.g., 4 PATRY, supra note 111, at § 10:151 (2012); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301,
312 (2d Cir. 1992); Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir.
1998).
123. See infra subsection V.A.1.
124. E.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991); Harper
& Row, 471 U.S. at 560; Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales USA, Inc., 528
F.3d 1258, 1264 (10th Cir. 2008).
125. Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 800–01 (5th Cir. 2002) (en
banc).
126. Id. at 801–02.
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justification for such a rule is to promote information exchange.127  As
explained by the Fifth Circuit, the dichotomy furthers expression “by
permitting the free flow of information in facts and ideas from their
emergence.”128  The Supreme Court has ratified this First Amend-
ment privilege for facts (at least in copyright law), holding that the
“fact/expression dichotomy” prevents facts alone and compilations of
facts lacking originality from being copyrighted.129
Judges similarly privilege factual speech when evaluating a copy-
right defendant’s fair-use defense.  Free speech rights rise to the fore-
ground when courts identify the plaintiff’s work as informational,
rather than a work of entertainment.130  In analyzing the “nature of
the original work” under the second fair-use factor, judges shield un-
authorized use of factual works while being less willing to recognize a
fair-use defense for use of fictional creations.131  Much turns on
whether the original work is considered “factual” or “creative.”132  A
copyright infringement suit against the compiler of an unauthorized
Harry Potter reference guide illustrates the point.  In rejecting the
compiler’s fair-use defense, the court explained that the “creative na-
ture” of the original Harry Potter books tipped the balance in favor of
their author.133  Once it had identified the nonfactual nature of the
original communication, the court could downplay the defendant’s free
speech interests.  On the other hand, an unauthorized biographer of L.
Ron Hubbard won his fair-use defense, in part, because the biogra-
phy’s original sources were deemed factual.134  The biographer quoted
extensively, without permission, from Hubbard’s writings.135  Yet be-
cause the quoted works dealt “with Hubbard’s life, his views on relig-
ion, human relations, the Church, etc.,” the court concluded that they
were “factual or informational,” thereby favoring the defendant on the
second fair-use factor.136
127. Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, 227 F.3d 1110, 1115 (9th Cir.
2000) (“The public interest in the free flow of information is assured by the law’s
refusal to recognize a valid copyright in facts.” (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S.
at 558)).
128. Veeck, 293 F.3d at 802.
129. Feist Publ’ns, 499 U.S. at 349–50, 363–64.
130. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990) (“[F]air use is more likely to be found
in factual works than fictional works.”).  For example, the fair-use defense fa-
vored a plaintiff that held copyright in video games and disfavored a plaintiff
suing for infringement of the copyright in its aircraft maintenance manuals.
Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Camp Sys. Int’l, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1378
(S.D. Ga. 2006); Sega Enters. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 934 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
131. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions,
1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 611 (2008).
132. See id.
133. Warner Bros., Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
134. New Era Publ’ns Int’l, ApS v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 904 F.2d 152, 157 (2d Cir. 1990).
135. Id. at 154.
136. Id. at 157.
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B. Categorization and Information Privacy
In sum, copyright’s idea/expression dichotomy and fair-use defense
focus on the original work to determine whether its protection via cop-
yright represents a threat to free expression.  Creative activity that is
particularly necessary as raw material for other creative output, like
“facts,” “scenes-a-faire,” or highly informational works, is singled out
as inappropriate for copyright protection.  Applying a similar method
to information privacy would focus attention on the particular data
meant to be safeguarded, not on how or why that data was used by the
defendant.  Courts would need to identify ex ante species of data that
should and should not be available for use by others.
This categorical approach makes some sense and should be utilized
by courts evaluating First Amendment challenges to information pri-
vacy laws.  In many ways, privacy law already operates under a cate-
gorical approach.  Just as the objective in copyright is to identify
communicative materials that are necessary for downstream creation,
the goal for privacy law is to identify personal data that is particularly
sensitive or intimate.137  Both common law and statutory privacy pro-
tections attempt to pinpoint types of personal information that are
highly sensitive and attach limits to their collection, use, and dissemi-
nation by others.  The common law tort for public disclosure of private
facts prevents public use of personal information if the information
publicized “would be highly offensive to a reasonable person” and is
not of public concern.138  Similarly, existing data privacy statutes tar-
get discrete, sensitive information like medical histories and financial
records for heightened regulation in the interest of consumer
protection.139
As currently employed by the courts, the categorical approach to
information privacy seems to adequately safeguard restrictions on the
use of especially sensitive personal information from First Amend-
137. See Abril, supra note 2, at 696 (“U.S. privacy tort law is configured to protect
privacy as defined by content, rather than social relationships or interpersonal
understandings of confidentiality.”).
138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).  Even if personal details are re-
vealed that the plaintiff finds highly upsetting, much more is needed before the
“highly offensive” element of the tort is satisfied.  Sidis v. F-R Publ’g Corp., 113
F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940).  As noted supra, scholars argue that this tort is
largely ineffective at protecting personal information, both in the offline and on-
line realms. See also Rodney A. Smolla, Privacy and the First Amendment Right
to Gather News, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1097, 1101 (1999) (stating that the tort
exists “more ‘in the books’ than in practice”).
139. For example, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
sets out very specific privacy rules regarding “individually identifiable health in-
formation” for those in the health care and insurance industries.  45 C.F.R.
§§ 160.102–160.103 (2012).  Other statutes regulate disclosure of financial infor-
mation, but only in very specific contexts.  Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 6801–6809 (2012); Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691b(b) (2012).
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ment challenges.  An illustrative example is credit-report regulation.
Even after accepting that records of consumer credit performance con-
stitute “speech,” courts have applied only intermediate scrutiny to
laws restricting the use of such records and held in favor of govern-
ment regulators.140  For example, a privacy statute preventing a
credit-reporting agency’s sale of targeted marketing lists survived a
First Amendment challenge.141  In deciding that the privacy interest
in one’s credit information outweighs free speech interests, the courts
have highlighted two characteristics of the data at issue.  First, credit-
report information is tailored to individual consumers.  As a result, it
is not a subject of “public concern” and, therefore, is considered less
essential to free expression.142  Second, credit-report information is
personally sensitive.143  Significant harm to the individual can result
from one unwanted disclosure.  In the credit-report cases, First
Amendment concerns appropriately receded once the data’s private,
sensitive nature was identified.144  The decisions in the credit-report
cases appear to match public sentiment for keeping certain personal
data private and restricting outside speech that uses such data.  One
can envision similar results when it comes to upholding limits on the
use of personal data involving health or sexuality.145
Exclusive reliance on the categorical approach would be a mistake,
however.  A solitary focus on the plaintiff’s communication would
140. See Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, 245 F.3d 809, 818–19 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Individual
Reference Servs. Corp. v. FTC, 145 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 2001), aff’d sub nom.
Trans Union LLC v. FTC, 295 F.3d 42 (D.C. Cir. 2002); see also Richards, supra
note 28, at 1164 n.67 (discussing application of intermediate scrutiny in credit-
reporting cases).
141. Trans Union Corp., 245 F.3d at 819.
142. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762 (1985);
Individual Reference Servs. Corp., 145 F. Supp. 2d at 40–41.
143. Trans Union Corp., 245 F.3d at 818–19; Toomer v. Garrett, 574 S.E.2d 76, 82–83,
90 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (upholding privacy claim against state officials for dis-
closing personnel file that included “sensitive” information, including employee’s
credit history).
144. What data collectors were actually doing with the credit-report information—
translating it into customized marketing lists to be sold to outside businesses—
was relatively unimportant to this analysis.  This is notable given the credit-re-
port regulation’s obvious role in restricting a particular kind of speech—advertis-
ing—that enjoys First Amendment protection in a multitude of other contexts.
E.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 564 (2001); 44 Liquormart, Inc.
v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
145. See, e.g., Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 224 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1125 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (finding no constitu-
tional violation from “Privacy Rule” promulgated by Department of Health and
Human Services that restricted doctor communications). But see Beverly Cohen,
Regulating Data Mining Post-Sorrell: Using HIPAA to Restrict Marketing Use of
Patients’ Private Medical Information, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1141, 1173 (2012)
(questioning whether the Sorrell decision places some HIPAA privacy restrictions
in jeopardy).
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come at a cost for consumers.  Take, for example, copyright law’s gen-
eral willingness, both through the idea/expression dichotomy and the
fair-use defense, to privilege unauthorized uses of factual information.
While there may be reasons for such a policy in copyright law, when it
comes to privacy law, a similar free ride for use of factual data makes
little sense.  Use of personal information, even when not of a sexual or
financial nature, can cause real harms.  Instrumentally, this informa-
tion can be aggregated to unmask consumers, revealing things they
wished to keep secret,146 as well as to track the online behavior of
children.147  Moreover, the mere perception of being surveilled by
others produces psychic harm.148  These concerns over the collection
and use of quotidian, everyday data motivate current legislative pro-
posals like “Do Not Track” acts and restrictions on the use of “like”
buttons on Web sites targeting minors.149  These proposed laws would
prevent some types of factual speech.  Copyright’s categorical willing-
ness to immunize fact-based speech, if exported to the data-privacy
context, would stymie these laws and allow these harms to continue.
The copyright approach to free speech and factual data also clashes
with an unacknowledged judicial intuition toward speech involving
truthful, factual details.  When confronted with First Amendment
challenges to the regulation of such speech (as opposed to laws affect-
ing more abstract literary, artistic, or ideological speech), courts have
bent constitutional doctrine to justify government regulation of such
speech.  In describing this phenomenon, Ashutosh Bhagwat maintains
that these decisions make sense because speech involving factual de-
tails can threaten greater social harm than other types of expression
while simultaneously being less necessary to listener self-govern-
ance.150  For example, in Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Wil-
lamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists,151 the Ninth
Circuit affirmed a lower court’s decision to issue an injunction shut-
ting down an abortion protest Web site listing the names and home
addresses of current abortion providers, as well as the names of abor-
tion providers that had been killed or wounded.152  It justified this
146. Calo, supra note 56, at 1131.
147. Somini Sengupta, Facebook Objects to a Privacy Law, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2012),
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A03E5D91F38F93BA35753C1
A9649D8B63.
148. Calo, supra note 56, at 1142–46; Richards, supra note 3, at 1948–52.
149. See Do Not Track Kids Act of 2011, H.R. 1895, 112th Cong. § 3(a)(2)(A)
(2011);  Andrew Couts, Facebook Says Child Privacy Law Shouldn’t Apply to
“Like” Button, DIGITAL TRENDS (Oct. 2, 2012), http://www.digitaltrends.com/so-
cial-media/facebook-coppa-like-button/.
150. Bhagwat, supra note 25, at 876.
151. Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Williamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists,
290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
152. Id. at 1088.
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decision by characterizing the Web site as a “true threat,”153 even
though the Web site clearly did not meet the “true threat” stan-
dard.154  Yet one can understand why the Ninth Circuit rejected the
anti-abortion activists’ First Amendment defense.  Given the potential
harm unleashed from the Web site’s specific disclosure of abortion pro-
vider addresses, and the arguable irrelevance of those addresses to
any rational conception of self-governance, free speech interests seem
less important and privacy concerns more relevant.  Depending on
context, factual data sometimes needs to be deemed less important to
expressive needs, not more important.
The ultimate problem with an exclusively categorical approach is
that it omits other concerns that are critical to reconciling privacy in-
terests with free speech.  Although information relating to sexual hab-
its and financial disclosures appears to be firmly within information
privacy expectations, this is not the sort of information that is valued
by data aggregators.155  Instead, today’s advertisers prize the infor-
mation gleaned from everyday online revelations.  But there can be
strong privacy interests in what appears, in the abstract, to be rela-
tively innocuous information.  For example, addresses are normally
considered public information and not subject to privacy restrictions.
But addresses can become extremely private depending on the circum-
stances of their revelation, particularly when revealed to others who
could potentially do the subject harm.  When the anti-abortion protes-
tors in the Planned Parenthood case revealed the names and ad-
dresses of abortion providers, their speech posed dangers deserving of
constitutional recognition.  Context matters.  For this reason, a focus
on the data rather than the activities of the data user is a good start
but an incomplete solution for the divide between privacy and free
speech.
IV. INTENT
Another way to reconcile free speech with privacy is to look to the
intent behind the speaker’s expression.  For all three intellectual prop-
erty regimes analyzed in this Article, the speaker’s mental state plays
a role in calibrating First Amendment interests.  Inquiries into bad
faith and commercial motivation represent explicit and central parts
153. Id.
154. According to established doctrine, speech can only be a “true threat” if it demon-
strates an intent to commit violence.  Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
However, there was no evidence in the facts of the case that the abortion protes-
tors that operated the Web site intended to commit violence. Planned
Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1091–92 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
155. See McGeveran, supra note 35, at 1138 (maintaining that most social-networking
sites would hesitate before using sensitive financial or sexual information out of
fear of offending potential customers).
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of the doctrinal balance between intangible property rights and the
right to free expression.  The experience of intellectual property law
suggests that evidence of intent should play an important, yet limited,
role in judicial analysis of First Amendment challenges to data pri-
vacy laws.
A. Improper Motive and Free Speech
The motivations relevant to calibrating intellectual property rights
with free speech can be divided into two broad areas: “bad faith” and
“commercial motivation.”  Considerations of bad faith can be found in
expression-based defenses for all three of the intellectual property re-
gimes discussed in this Article.  Courts have probed user bad faith
when construing copyright’s fair-use defense,156 and defendant “good
faith” has been referenced in cases evaluating First Amendment de-
fenses to right-of-publicity claims.157  Yet bad faith has greatest sali-
ence when considering expression-based defenses in trademark law.
To state a claim for trademark infringement, a plaintiff must al-
lege facts demonstrating ownership of a valid trademark and use of
that mark by the defendant in a way that is likely to confuse consum-
ers.158  Even if the plaintiff carries his or her burden of proof as to
these two elements, a defendant may escape liability through two ju-
dicially created “fair use” defenses: descriptive and nominative fair
use.  These defenses provide some important breathing room for free
expression even when that expression could potentially confuse some
consumers.159  Descriptive fair use exempts unauthorized mark uses
that accurately describe a defendant’s product.  Hence, even though a
food products manufacturer held trademark rights in the term “Fish-
Fri,” a rival manufacturer could also use the term to describe its own
batter mix for frying fish.160  Nominative fair use applies when a de-
fendant uses a mark not to brand its own product but to identify the
plaintiff’s product.  For example, when a newspaper used the trade-
marked term “Boston Marathon” to report on the famous race, it satis-
fied the nominative fair-use defense.161  The newspaper was allowed
156. William F. Patry & Shira Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued: Profit, Presump-
tions, and Parody, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 667, 685 (1992).  In general,
however, such inquiries into defendant intent are rare.  Beebe, supra note 131, at
607–08 (“The data suggest that considerations of fairness, propriety, and good or
bad faith have not played a significant role in our fair use case law—notwith-
standing the frequency with which opinions intoned that fair use is an ‘equitable
doctrine.’”).
157. Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1359–60 (D.N.J. 1981).
158. Hensley Mfg., Inc. v. Propride, Inc., 579 F.3d 603, 609 (6th Cir. 2009).
159. See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111
(2004).
160. Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1983).
161. WCVB-TV v. Bos. Athletic Ass’n, 926 F.2d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 1991).
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to use the trademark because it used the mark to identify the race, not
to market a race of its own.162
As articulated by the courts (and, in the case of descriptive fair use,
also by statute), both of these defenses require an evaluation of the
defendant’s mindset and are unavailable to those judged to be acting
with improper motives.  In evaluating the descriptive fair-use defense,
courts are statutorily required to look to whether the defendant used
the mark “in good faith.”163  Nominative fair use, a strictly common
law construction, is similar.  The Third Circuit states that the nomina-
tive fair-use test requires an examination of “the intent of the defen-
dant in adopting the mark,”164 adding that “[i]t is the circumstance in
which a court does not find bad intent but does find confusion that a
nominative fair use defense will be most useful.”165  In a similar vein,
the Ninth Circuit requires an analysis of whether the defendant used
“only so much of the mark . . . as is reasonably necessary to identify
the products or services,”166 an inquiry that some describe as synony-
mous with investigating the defendant’s intent.167  As characterized
by one federal appellate judge, “the entire ‘nominative fair use’ defense
asks whether the use was made with the intent to confuse.”168
A different inquiry into speaker mental state asks not whether the
defendant acted in bad faith, but rather whether she was commer-
cially motivated.  If so, free speech interests are deemed less pressing
and the rights of the intellectual property holder tend to take prece-
dence.  Again, this type of mental-state inquiry is common to copy-
right, trademark, and right-of-publicity law.
In copyright, the first factor of the fair-use defense explicitly re-
quires courts to consider “the purpose and character of the use, includ-
ing whether such use is of a commercial nature.”169  Some courts have
described the first factor as an inquiry into commercial motive.170
Unauthorized use of copyrighted material in an advertising context is
particularly frowned upon since the advertiser’s primary intent in us-
162. Id.
163. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2006).
164. Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 225–26 (3d Cir.
2005).
165. Id. at 227 n.7.
166. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992).
167. Douglas L. Rogers, Ending the Circuit Split over Use of a Competing Mark in
Advertising—The Blackstone Code, 5 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 157, 192
n.214 (2006).
168. Lendingtree, 425 F.3d at 243 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
169. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012).
170. E.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Ergonome Inc., 387 F.3d 403, 408–09 (5th Cir.
2004); New Era Publ’ns Int’l, ApS v. Henry Holt and Co., 873 F.2d 576, 591 (2d
Cir. 1989).
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ing the work seems to be to sell a product.171  This holds true even if
the plaintiff’s original communication was also intended to sell a prod-
uct.172  Evidence of commercial motivation may negate a defendant’s
other, more laudatory reasons for using copyrighted material.  For ex-
ample, despite its journalistic importance, an unauthorized re-broad-
cast of copyrighted footage of the beating of truck driver Reginald
Denny during the 1992 Los Angeles riots on a television newscast was
deemed not to be fair use given a finding that the newscaster was mo-
tivated by profit.173
On the other hand, noncommercial motivations are looked on fa-
vorably.  In one seminal copyright fair-use analysis, the Supreme
Court determined that when individual users of video recording de-
vices made unauthorized copies of copyrighted television programs for
the noncommercial purpose of privately watching their favorite shows
at a more convenient time, such activity was fair use.174  Central to
the Court’s determination was its perception that the users lacked a
“commercial motivation” in making their unauthorized copies.175
In a similar fashion, some courts place great weight on commercial
motivations in deciding what should triumph—a celebrity’s right of
publicity or an unauthorized user’s free speech interests.  For exam-
ple, courts in Missouri employ a “predominant purpose test,” which
asks whether the motivation behind the use of a person’s identity is
commercial exploitation or expressive activity.176  If the predominant
purpose is commercial exploitation, then the defendant’s First Amend-
ment defense fails.  In the main case setting out this test, the court
relied on evidence that the defendant, a comic book publisher, used a
professional hockey player’s persona in its Spawn comic books to in-
duce hockey fans to purchase its comics.177  This evidence led the
court to conclude that the use of the hockey player’s persona was
predominantly a “ploy” to sell comic books, and the court, therefore,
found in favor of the hockey player.178  In other words, the publisher’s
commercial motivation negated a potential First Amendment defense.
Outside of Missouri, other courts have used commercial intent to
171. 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A][1][c]
(2012).
172. Id.
173. L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 305 F.3d 924, 939 n.13 (9th Cir. 2002).
174. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc, 464 U.S. 417, 449 (1984).
175. Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (inter-
preting the Sony decision).
176. John Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003).
177. Id. at 366.
178. Id. at 374.
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downplay the First Amendment interests of right-of-publicity
defendants.179
Trademark law also scrutinizes commercial motives.  In addition to
the descriptive and nominative fair-use tests, trademark law’s third
major initiative to safeguard expressive activity, the Rogers test, asks
whether use of the plaintiff’s trademark is (1) “artistic[ally] relevant”
to the defendant’s work; and (2) whether use of the plaintiff’s trade-
mark is “explicitly misleading.”180  If the court answers yes to the first
question and no to the second, the defendant escapes liability.  Even
more so than trademark’s two fair-use defenses, the Rogers test has
the potential to immunize a great deal of expressive activity from
trademark infringement claims.  Overall, courts have interpreted its
two prongs in a defendant-friendly manner, adopting a broad view of
what is artistically relevant181 and ensuring that the “explicitly mis-
leading” standard puts the plaintiff to a higher burden of proof than
the standard likelihood of confusion analysis.182  Yet courts also posit
that only noncommercial expression is eligible for the Rogers safe har-
bor.183  Hence, it is of enormous importance for defendants seeking
the protection of Rogers to convince the court that their trademark use
was not commercial.
Often, the commerciality question is determined by reference to
the defendant’s intent.184  For example, the Third Circuit rejected a
179. E.g., Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 1994) (explaining that
fictional novel could violate individual’s publicity rights if it was “a disguised ad-
vertisement for the sale of goods or services” (quoting Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875
F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir. 1989))); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339,
1360 (D.N.J. 1981) (rejecting First Amendment defense for Elvis tribute act be-
cause “the primary purpose” was to expropriate the value of the likeness of the
singer).
180. E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir.
2008).
181. E.g., id. at 1100; Roxbury Entm’t v. Penthouse Media Grp., Inc., 669 F. Supp. 2d
1170, 1176 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
182. E.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 899–900 (9th Cir. 2002);
Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publn’s Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1379 (2d Cir. 1993);
Volkswagen AG v. Dorling Kindersley Publ’g, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d 793, 801–02,
810 (E.D. Mich. 2009).
183. Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1018 (3d Cir. 2008); 6 J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 31:144.50
(4th ed. 2012).
184. To be fair, courts sometimes also take an objective approach, basing their deci-
sion on the type of product bearing the defendant’s expression.  They typically
view use of a trademark in a film or song as noncommercial. See, e.g., Mattel, 296
F.3d at 900–02; Winchester Mystery House v. Global Asylum, Inc., 210 Cal. App.
4th 579, 590–94 (Cal. Ct. App., Oct. 24, 2012); see also Jordan v. Jewel Food
Stores, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1105 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (page in Sports Illus-
trated issue paid for and created by grocery store chain congratulating Michael
Jordan on his basketball achievements considered “non-commercial speech” ex-
empt from trademark false-endorsement claim because it did not tout a particu-
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Rogers defense advanced by the National Football League (NFL) when
it used, without authorization, the voice of legendary sports an-
nouncer John Facenda in its twenty-two minute film The Making of
Madden NFL 06.185  Facenda’s estate sued for false endorsement, con-
tending that fans hearing his voice on the film would assume that he
had lent his approval to the film and the videogame it was describing,
John Madden Football.186  The NFL maintained its periodic use of
Facenda’s voice represented an artistic choice for a documentary film,
not an effort to confuse consumers.187  The court rejected this argu-
ment, explaining that the NFL’s “economic motivation” rendered the
film commercial speech.188  Because no one in the film had anything
negative to say about the videogame, the court did not believe the film
had a “documentary purpose.”189  The court found that the film was
only meant to serve as an advertisement for the Madden vide-
ogame.190  As a result, the use was commercially motivated, and the
NFL could not take advantage of the Rogers defense.191
The Ninth Circuit performed a similar analysis when Vanna White
sued for the unauthorized use of her persona in a print advertisement
for Samsung VCRs.192  White sued under the same trademark cause
of action used by Facenda’s estate.193  Samsung responded to White’s
suit with a free speech defense based on parody.194  The use in ques-
tion featured only a robot dressed in a gown, pearls, and blonde wig
standing next to the Wheel of Fortune letterboard above the caption:
“Longest-running game show, 2012 A.D.”195  The court accepted
White’s claim that consumers viewing the ad would mistakenly think
she had endorsed Samsung’s product.196  It then brusquely rejected
Samsung’s free speech argument, explaining that trademark law’s po-
lar product).  On the other hand, more tangible merchandise such as T-shirts and
coffee mugs is usually deemed commercial and, hence, not eligible for Rogers’ pro-
tection.  Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs. v. New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 1279–80
(11th Cir. 2012); Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 398–99, 403 (8th
Cir. 1987). But see Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302,
1339–40 (N.D. Ga. 2008).
185. Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1018 (3d Cir. 2008).
186. Id. at 1014.
187. Id. at 1016.
188. Id. at 1017.
189. Id. at 1018.
190. Id. at 1017.
191. Id. at 1016, 1018. See also Dillinger, LLC v. Elec. Arts, No.
1:09–cv–1236–JMS–DKL, Inc., 2011 WL 2457678, at *4 n.1 (S.D. Ind. June 16,
2011) (describing Rogers test as interrogating “intentional use of another’s intel-
lectual property for commercial profit”).
192. White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
193. Id. at 1397.
194. Id. at 1401.
195. Id. at 1396.
196. Id. at 1400.
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tential for censoring advertising presented no First Amendment con-
cerns.197  Even if Samsung meant to spoof the famous letter turner,
perhaps making fun of Ms. White’s longevity and robotic demeanor,
the court found it potentially dispositive that Samsung also meant to
confuse consumers regarding White’s endorsement.198  Ultimately,
the court’s decision hinged on its belief that Samsung intended the
commercial as an advertisement.199  Once it decided that Samsung
primarily intended a “knock-off,” not a “parody,” it was able to ignore
the free speech implications of a judgment in White’s favor.200
B. Information Privacy and Proscribed Motivations
The discussion above reveals that one method for balancing socie-
tal interests with expressive rights is to scrutinize speaker motiva-
tions.  Intellectual property law, particularly trademark doctrine,
hinges the success of its expression-based defenses on showings of
speaker “good faith” and noncommercial motive.  This method at-
tempts to protect First Amendment values by only restricting speech
made with the wrong intentions.
To many First Amendment scholars, however, it is unclear why a
speaker’s motive should ever matter, particularly when primary con-
sideration is given to the First Amendment interests of listeners.201  If
First Amendment interests are meant to turn on the value or harm of
the speech to others, the speaker’s state of mind should be disre-
garded.202  The motivations of communicators seem largely irrelevant
if the First Amendment is meant to facilitate the search for truth or
provide information for democratic self-governance.203
Nevertheless, as in intellectual property law, intent should have
some role in assessing information privacy’s First Amendment bound-
197. Id. at 1401.
198. Id. at 1400–01.
199. Id. at 1401.
200. Id.  On the other hand, without evidence of commercial intent, Rogers can be an
effective tool for defendants.  To take one example, when high-end resort operator
Club Med sued the maker of a film titled Club Dread for trademark infringement,
the court looked favorably on the filmmaker’s Rogers defense.  In determining
whether there was a likelihood of confusion, the court faulted Club Med for fail-
ing to offer any evidence of the filmmaker’s intent to confuse consumers.  Most
significant for our purposes, later on in the opinion, the court highlighted the
evidence of such intent (or lack thereof) to hold that the filmmaker was “likely to
succeed on its First Amendment claim under Rogers and its progeny.”  Club
Medite´rane´e, S.A. v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., No. 04–20273–CIV, 2004 WL
5589591, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 17, 2004).
201. Bhagwat, supra note 31, at 47.
202. Larry Alexander, Free Speech and Speaker’s Intent, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 21
(1995).
203. See Richards, supra note 14, at 394 (describing these as the “two principal theo-
ries of the First Amendment . . . recognized by courts and scholars”).
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aries.  There are three main reasons for using intent to assess the con-
stitutionality of data privacy laws.  First, from a practical perspective,
judges can easily incorporate an analysis of intent into their larger
consideration of the constitutionality of information privacy laws.
Many other areas of the law focus on evidence of mental state, includ-
ing some pockets of First Amendment jurisprudence.204  From crimi-
nal law to tort law, judges routinely must assess a defendant’s inner
thoughts in order to determine whether there has been a legal viola-
tion.  Hence, there is a level of judicial comfort with examinations of
intent.  As mentioned, a doctrinal innovation is more likely to take
root if it resembles other, more firmly established legal standards.205
Second, and more importantly, some consideration of intent makes
sense when other values behind the First Amendment are considered.
When speaker interests are taken into account, intent’s relevance be-
comes clearer.  Much of First Amendment law is justified by reference
to speaker autonomy.206  Leslie Kendrick writes persuasively that it is
improper to hold speakers strictly liable for speech-related harms pre-
cisely because of these autonomy concerns.207  A legal regime that did
nothing to acknowledge speaker mental state would not show a proper
regard for speaker interests in being able to freely and openly
communicate.208
Third, some consideration of intent is necessary when punishing
speech to avoid undesirable chilling effects.  Strict liability for speech-
related acts potentially stifles expression.  By requiring some evidence
of a culpable mental state before holding a speaker liable, the law pro-
204. Speaker mental state has been used by the Supreme Court as the constitutional
fulcrum to reconcile some aspects of tort law with the First Amendment.  In ac-
tions for libel, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, the
publisher’s “actual malice” must be demonstrated; otherwise, the publisher’s
First Amendment interest prevails.  New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 287–88 (1964); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988).
Similarly, the Supreme Court allows punishment of speech that incites violence
but only after proof of specific intent.  Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003);
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
205. See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.
206. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557,
573 (1995); see also C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of
Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 1000 (1978) (“[I]n a just social order the law must
respect one’s choice of speech content.”); Robert Post, Equality and Autonomy in
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1517, 1525 (1997) (“To com-
promise individual autonomy is to compromise the foundation of the democratic
value of collective self-determination.”).
207. Leslie Kendrick, Free Speech and Guilty Minds (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 19
cmt. d (1998) (“Most courts express[ ] concern that imposing strict liability for the
dissemination of false and defective information would significantly impinge on
free speech . . . .”).
208. Kendrick, supra note 207, at 23.
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vides notice to those whose speech may cause sanctionable harms and
offers breathing space to those who (even if misguidedly) wish to
speak out of noble intentions.209  Thus, when evaluating a data user’s
First Amendment defense, some consideration should be paid to the
motivations guiding their data use.
These arguments have not gone unnoticed by some information
privacy scholars.  In assessing First Amendment limits on informa-
tion-privacy protections, they recommend greater attention to speaker
interests and speaker mental state (and less of a focus on the category
of personal information used by the speaker).210  For example, Jane
Bambauer calls for an invigoration of the common law tort against
“intrusion upon seclusion” to address modern privacy concerns.211
Under Bambauer’s conception of the tort, certain observations of
human activities would be prohibited if the observation “incorporates
a sufficient amount of intent.”212  Part of this approach would require
scrutiny of the reasons behind the defendant’s use.213  Similarly,
Daniel Solove urges courts to resolve the privacy/free expression
boundary by adopting a more contextual approach.214  He contends
that by going beyond study of the data itself and determining which
motivations for secondary data use are acceptable and which should
prevent application of a First Amendment defense, privacy law could
more effectively address consumer injury.215
Ultimately, intent’s role in representing speaker interests makes it
a necessary part of balancing information privacy with free speech.
But, for two main reasons, intent should not be a deciding factor in
most cases and its consideration should be closely cabined.  First,
strenuous reliance on defendant intent offers little information for po-
tential litigants.  Requiring courts to address the data privacy/free
speech balance by focusing exclusively on defendant motivation could
yield unintended consequences.216  Although courts may be comforta-
209. New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279; Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent, and the
Chilling Effect, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1633 (2013).
210. Bambauer, The New Intrusion, supra note 31, at 207–08; SOLOVE, supra note 41,
at 47.
211. Bambauer, The New Intrusion, supra note 31, at 231.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. SOLOVE, supra note 41, at 47.
215. See id.; Daniel Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protec-
tions Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 976–77 (2003).
216. For example, some legal authorities already maintain that all uses of online data
are “commercial,” suggesting a relatively free hand for government regulation.
E.g., Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, 245 F.3d 809, 818–19 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see
McGeveran, supra note 35, at 1163; Richards, supra note 14, at 1192.  But this is
completely at odds with the approach taken by the Supreme Court in Sorrell.
The pharmaceutical marketers in that case were engaged in commercial activity,
but the Court had no trouble asserting that important First Amendment inter-
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ble intuiting a defendant’s mental state, motive is hard for parties to
assess in advance of litigation.  In the trademark context, courts have
given themselves wide latitude in determining bad faith.217  The Sec-
ond Circuit explains that “any evidence that is probative of intent to
trade on the protected mark would be relevant to the good faith in-
quiry” necessary to show descriptive fair use.218  Proof of intent to con-
fuse consumers surely seems relevant to this inquiry, but courts
sometimes construe bad faith more broadly and seize on any behavior
that seems to transgress standard commercial practice.  For example,
a defendant’s decision not to purchase a readily available license to
use the trademarked song title “Sing, Sing, Sing” meant that it could
not defend its use of the term “Swing, Swing, Swing” to sell golf clubs
as fair use.219  In another case, the court highlighted the “hidden” na-
ture of metatag use of trademarks in rejecting a nominative fair-use
defense for such behavior.220  Trademark holders suing for infringe-
ment and defendants seeking the safe harbors of descriptive or nomi-
native fair use can find themselves on uncertain ground, not knowing
how a court will elect to interpret “bad faith.”
It is not only that “bad faith” is an amorphous category.  Inquiries
into motive are inherently messy.221  Privacy scholars attempt to give
content to an information-privacy mental-state requirement by using
words like “deliberate,” “obnoxious,” and “a sufficient amount of in-
tent,” and contend that these terms will be concretized over years of
common law development.222  But these words seem plagued with the
same inherent opacity as “bad faith.”
Second, limiting the regulation of online data usage to acts done in
“bad faith” could short circuit regulatory efforts.  Such proof could be
simply too hard for plaintiffs to come by and result in inevitable First
Amendment victories for data collectors and users.  History shows
that intent requirements can sap the effectiveness of once promising
legal innovations, particularly when it comes to calibrating privacy
and free speech.  One need look no further than the unrealized poten-
tial of longstanding common law privacy torts.  Although states are
divided on this issue, the general trend is for common law private dis-
ests were at stake, enough so to strike down Vermont’s data privacy law.  Sorrell
v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2670 (2011).
217. As Bill McGeveran notes, some courts have merely reused their analysis of the
intent factor from the likelihood-of-confusion analysis to determine “good faith”
for purposes of the fair-use defense. See William McGeveran, Rethinking Fair
Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 49, 86 (2008).
218. E.M.I. Catalogue P’ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos, Inc., 228 F.3d 56,
66–67 (2d Cir. 2000); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 183, at § 11:49 (discussing
statutory descriptive fair use).
219. E.M.I., 228 F.3d at 66–67.
220. Tdata Inc. v. Aircraft Tech. Pub., 411 F. Supp. 2d 901, 910–12 (S.D. Ohio 2006).
221. West, supra note 47, at 638.
222. Bambauer, The New Intrusion, supra note 31, at 231–35.
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closure claims to require proof of intent; negligent disclosures are in-
sufficient to trigger liability.223  Intrusion upon seclusion claims also
require intent.224  There is wide agreement that by requiring proof of
intentional conduct, courts have eviscerated these causes of action.225
On the whole, plaintiffs simply cannot come up with, or lack the finan-
cial will to try to locate, sufficient evidence of intent to prosecute these
actions.  A similar emphasis on intent in balancing new data privacy
protections with free speech concerns might produce parallel results,
in effect immunizing all data uses that are not obviously committed in
“bad faith.”  The result would be a new round of measures designed to
safeguard privacy interests that would founder on the rock of too-
stringent mental-state requirements.
The better course is to presume that commercially motivated uses
of personal data deserve less First Amendment protection than most
other types of data usage.  Apart from this presumption, speaker in-
tent should be relevant only in exceptional cases.  First Amendment
claims for commercially motivated use of data should be greeted more
skeptically than noncommercial ones.  For example, in the Sorrell
case,226 the use of prescribing data to market brand-name drugs to
physicians was commercially motivated and, hence, should have trig-
gered a lower tier of First Amendment review.  This would have hap-
pened if the Sorrell court had assessed First Amendment interests in
the same manner as intellectual property law.  For example, under
trademark doctrine, evidence of the speaker’s commercial motive
causes courts to downplay First Amendment interests (in the form of
the Rogers test).227  Employing commercial motive in this fashion
makes some sense given the Supreme Court’s commercial speech doc-
trine (ignored in Sorrell), which singles out speech made to propose a
commercial transaction for a lesser brand of First Amendment re-
view.228  It also follows intellectual property law’s longstanding prece-
dent—whether through the right of publicity’s predominant purpose
test, the first factor of copyright fair use, or application of trademark’s
Rogers test—of downgrading First Amendment arguments made by
commercially motivated speakers.229
223. See, e.g., Randolph v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 973 A.2d 702, 711 (D.C. 2009);
Hudson v. S.D. Warren Co., 608 F. Supp. 477, 481 (D. Me. 1985).
224. Bailer v. Erie Ins. Exch., 687 A.2d 1375, 1380–81 (Md. Ct. App. 1997); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B.
225. See Citron, supra note 33, at 1828.
226. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
227. See, e.g., E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095 (9th
Cir. 2008).
228. E.g., Bd. of Trs. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
229. With some justices calling for the general abandonment of the commercial speech
doctrine, see 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 517 (1996)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part); id. at 522–23 (Thomas, J., concurring in part),
learning the particular lessons of intellectual property law with regard to com-
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Apart from consideration of commercial intent, courts and legisla-
tors should limit the number of proscribed motivations eligible for con-
sideration.  A generalized inquiry into “bad faith” should be avoided.
Instead, to avoid some of the problems that have plagued both trade-
mark’s fair-use defenses and the common law privacy torts, unaccept-
able motivations for data collection should be specifically described in
new information privacy statutes.  One could envision proof of intent
to defraud consumers automatically invalidating a data user’s free
speech argument.  Perhaps exceptions for collection and use of per-
sonal data motivated by scientific research or law enforcement pur-
poses could be written into the new data-privacy laws.  Outside of
these clearly delineated boundaries, however, speaker motivation
should not control when weighing information privacy against free
speech.230  Instead, a third consideration needs to be added to the mix.
V. ASSESSING THE DEFENDANT’S SPEECH CONTRIBUTION
Thus far, we have considered two potential mechanisms for cali-
brating privacy with free speech.  One trains its attention on the sub-
ject of the speech, i.e., the plaintiff’s original communicative
contribution.  Another scrutinizes the defendant’s motives.  A third
approach examines the defendant’s activity, not for evidence of bad
faith or commercial motivation, but to assess the defendant’s contribu-
tion to public discourse.  This approach is particularly prevalent in
cases addressing First Amendment challenges to the right of publicity.
Judicially devised doctrinal defenses evaluate the defendant’s speech
contribution and determine free speech interests on that basis.  Simi-
lar measures, considered in conjunction with the first two approaches,
could offer a more balanced means for calibrating data privacy with
free speech, one that would uphold the constitutionality of tailored
limitations on the collection and use of online personal data.
A. IP’s Formalized Mechanisms for Assessing New
Expression
All three intellectual property regimes, at times, scrutinize the de-
fendant’s speech contribution to determine whether the property right
at issue should yield to First Amendment interests.  Trademark courts
sometimes engage in an ad hoc balancing test designed to safeguard a
defendant’s valuable expressive activities.  In this test, a court scruti-
nizes the manner in which the defendant uses the plaintiff’s trade-
mercial motivation becomes all the more imperative if meaningful data privacy
protection is to be realized.
230. Cf. Joseph Blocher, Nonsense and the Freedom of Speech: What Meaning Means
for the First Amendment 51 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (dis-
cussing value of clarity in First Amendment doctrine).
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mark.231  If it is recognized from the outset that the defendant is using
the plaintiff’s mark in a socially valuable, expressive way, the court
will apply that understanding to the multifactor likelihood-of-confu-
sion test.232  One commentator describes this as “putting a discrete
judicial finger on the scales in favor of the defendant.”233  This ap-
proach has been used to protect the unauthorized use of trademarks
for purposes of parody and political speech.234
The right of publicity and copyright law adopt similar but much
more formalized approaches.  By potentially allowing celebrities and
authors to block downstream expression, the right of publicity and
copyright threaten new speech.  In assessing this threat, courts have
articulated two defenses meant to balance intellectual property inter-
ests with the First Amendment: transformativeness and
newsworthiness.
1. Transformativeness
In assessing a First Amendment defense to a celebrity’s charge of
publicity-rights infringement, courts examine the “transformative-
ness” of the defendant’s expressive activity.  This is an independent
and absolute defense to a prima facie violation of the right of publicity.
First articulated over a decade ago by the California Supreme Court in
Comedy III Productions v. Saderup:
[The transformativeness] inquiry is whether the celebrity likeness is one of
the raw materials from which an original work is synthesized, or whether the
depiction or imitation of the celebrity is the very sum and substance of the
work in question.235
This is a broad standard for First Amendment immunity from suit.
The Saderup court was careful to note that “transformative” contribu-
tions could take a wide range of forms and should not be limited to
types of speech already well-recognized under the First Amendment,
such as parody.236  Under the transformativeness analysis, unautho-
rized use of the persona in a new context or to make an unexpected
expressive point is protected speech.237
231. 6 MCCARTHY, supra note 183, at § 31:139.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. E.g., Utah Lighthouse Ministry v. Found. for Apologetic Info. & Research, 527
F.3d 1045, 1057 (10th Cir. 2008); MasterCard Int’l v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm.
Inc., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1046, 1050–51 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
235. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 800–01, 809 (Cal.
2001).
236. Id. at 809.
237. Other courts have followed the California Supreme Court’s lead.  In determining
whether an artist’s representation of Tiger Woods was transformative, and there-
fore immune from an infringement suit, the Sixth Circuit ignored whether the
artist intended to profit from Woods’s celebrity.  What was critical in determining
the proper weight of the expressive interests at play was the presence of “sub-
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The transformativeness standard is best understood in contrast to
the previous mechanisms discussed for balancing intellectual property
rights with free expression.  In assessing transformativeness, a court
analyzes the defendant’s expressive project, not the type of expression
first created by the plaintiff.  This approach emphasizes the defen-
dant’s contribution to public discourse, not the legal entitlement held
by the plaintiff.  For example, when right-of-publicity defendants have
appropriated celebrity personas and turned them into video game ava-
tars, the courts have looked to the degree of change to the persona.
When Sega took singer Kieran Kirby’s likeness but also contributed a
dissimilar physique, different costumes, and portrayed her as a
twenty-fifth-century news reporter, the court concluded that a “trans-
formation” had taken place.238  On the other hand, when video game
manufacturers import college athletes into their games without some-
how altering their appearance or expected role, transformation has
not been found and the defendant’s First Amendment argument
fails.239
The transformativeness inquiry ignores considerations of intent.
For example, when DC Comics published two comic books featuring
characters with names and physical features similar to two real-life
musicians, rockers Johnny and Edgar Winter, the Winters sued for
violation of their right of publicity.240  DC Comics asserted a First
Amendment defense.241  In response, the Winters maintained that the
comic book manufacturer had intentionally borrowed their likenesses
to generate interest and stimulate sales.242  The California Supreme
Court explained that, in evaluating whether DC Comics’ use was
transformative and, consequently, protected under the First Amend-
ment, such evidence of intent was “irrelevant.”243  “The question is
whether the work is transformative,” the Court noted, “not how it is
marketed.”244  Similarly, when a video game manufacturer used the
name and most popular song of the rock band The Romantics without
stantial transformative elements,” which meant that the work was “entitled to
the full protection of the First Amendment.” See, e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Pub.,
Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 951 (6th Cir. 2003).
238. Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 47, 59 (2006).
239. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268,
1276 (9th Cir. 2013); Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc.,717 F.3d 141, 166 (3d Cir. 2013)
(“If we are to find some transformative element, we must look somewhere other
than just the in-game digital recreation of Appellant.”); Davis v. Electronic Arts,
Inc., No. 10-03328 RS, 2012 WL 3860819 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2012); Keller v.
Electronic Arts, Inc., No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 530108 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8,
2010).
240. Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d, 473, 476 (Cal. 2003).
241. Id.
242. Id. at 479–80.
243. Id. at 479.
244. Id.
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permission, the determinative issue was the manufacturer’s addition
of “numerous creative elements,” not the manufacturer’s intent to
trade on The Romantics’ popularity.245
Transformativeness is also a consideration in copyright fair use
and, as with the right of publicity, it requires an assessment of the
defendant’s speech contribution.  Unlike the other three copyright
fair-use factors, the first factor engages with the defendant’s appropri-
ation by inquiring into its “purpose and character.”  In considering the
first factor, courts will inquire as to whether the defendant’s use was
“transformative.”  Copyright’s transformation analysis has been used
to immunize a broad array of unauthorized uses of copyrighted mater-
ials, particularly when those uses serve an entirely new purpose from
the original.  For example, the Google search engine’s unauthorized
creation of “thumbnail” copies—reduced, lower-resolution versions of
the copyrighted, full-sized images featured on third-party Web sites—
to create a searchable index was considered transformative and,
therefore, fair use.246  So was an artist’s unauthorized use of a photog-
rapher’s “serene,” black and white, naturalistic photographs of human
subjects for a “crude and jarring” collage that incorporated color and
distortion.247  On the other hand, unauthorized uses that do not em-
ploy the original work for a new purpose will not be deemed trans-
formative.  For example, the unauthorized photocopying of scientific
journal articles for use in laboratories was not considered transforma-
tive and, therefore, did not constitute fair use.248  The Second Circuit
concluded such copying is disfavored under the first factor, even if un-
dertaken for “archival” purposes, because it “merely supersedes the
objects of the original creation.”249
2. Newsworthiness
In addition to the transformativeness defense, courts have created
an alternative standard for reconciling the right of publicity with free
speech interests.  A newsworthiness defense exempts journalistic uses
of celebrity, even when the journalism at issue consists only of mun-
245. Romantics v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 758, 762, 766 & n.3 (E.D.
Mich. 2008).
246. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007).
247. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706 (2d Cir. 2013).
248. Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 923 (2d Cir. 1995).  In other
cases, courts have recognized exact copies made for a completely, separate pur-
pose from the original as being transformative under the first fair-use factor.
E.g., Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
249. Texaco, 60 F.3d at 919–20 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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dane celebrity gossip.250  (Newsworthiness is not a consideration
under copyright fair use.251)  Courts adjudicating California law have
described this inquiry in an open-ended fashion, characterizing the
analysis as whether the defendant’s work “concerns a matter of public
interest.”252  Although one court has attempted to limit the definition
of public interest,253 others hold that even works of entertainment re-
ceive constitutional protection under the newsworthiness exception if
they fulfill an “informative role.”254
As with the transformativeness defense, the newsworthiness de-
fense focuses on the nature of the defendant’s contribution, not the
character of the interest held by the plaintiff.  The exemption applies
to any use of celebrity personae in a presentation deemed to be
“news.”255  In this context, “news” has been defined generously, apply-
ing to much more than just conventional news sources and covering
much more than political journalism.256  Courts have also been gener-
ous in determining which personas can be newsworthy, even sug-
gesting in a recent case that “liking” something on Facebook is
“newsworthy” to the user’s circle of Facebook friends.257  By defining
“news” in such a broad manner, courts train their First Amendment
analysis on the defendant’s use of the celebrity material rather than
on the type of subject matter that the celebrity plaintiff is claiming an
interest in.
250. See, e.g., Toffoloni v. LFP Publ’g Grp., LLC, 572 F.3d 1201, 1208 & n.2 (11th Cir.
2009); Titan Sports, Inc. v. Comics World Corp., 870 F.2d 85, 87–88 (2d Cir.
1989).
251. The Supreme Court explicitly rejects any special First Amendment defense in
copyright cases for news reporting.  Harper & Row, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 557 (1985); see also Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164,
1183 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Waving the news reporting flag is not a get out of jail free
card in the copyright arena.”).  In fact, courts adjudicating fair-use defenses are
quite willing to second-guess journalistic assertions regarding the importance of
particular copyrighted material to a particular news article or broadcast. E.g.,
L.A. News Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1997); see
Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 36, at 18–21.
252. Davis v. Electronic Arts, Inc., No. 10-03328 RS, 2012 WL 3860819, at *6–*7 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 29, 2012); Keller v. Electronic Arts, Inc., No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL
530108, at *5–*6 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 8, 2010).
253. See, e.g., Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 580 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 2009).
254. Davis, 2012 WL 3860819, at *7; Gionfriddio v. Major League Baseball, 94 Cal.
App. 4th 400, 410 (2001); Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., 15 Cal. App. 4th 536, 543
(1993).
255. Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 131–32 (2d Cir. 1984).
256. E.g., C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Me-
dia, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 823–24 (8th Cir. 2007); Chapman v. Journal Concepts,
Inc., 528 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1084–85, 1096 (D. Haw. 2007); Time Inc. v. Sand
Creek Partners, L.P., 825 F. Supp. 210, 213 (S.D. Ind. 1993).
257. Fraley v. Facebook, 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 804–05 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
2014] INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY’S LESSONS 791
Also like the transformativeness defense, in determining new-
sworthiness, the motive of the journalist/defendant is not a considera-
tion.  As explained by one court:
[T]he fact that a publication may have used a person’s name or likeness solely
or primarily to increase the circulation of a newsworthy article—and thus to
increase profits—does not mean that the name or likeness has been used for
trade purposes within the meaning of the statute . . . .Whether an item is
newsworthy depends solely on the content of the article—not the publisher’s
motive to increase circulation.258
This can hold true even if the defendant obviously employed the plain-
tiff’s persona for a commercial purpose.  For example, when the San
Jose Mercury News took quarterback Joe Montana’s likeness not only
for its front page, but also to sell commemorative posters, the court
immunized the use under the newsworthiness exception.259
B. Evaluating the Speech Contributions of Data Users
Both the transformativeness and newsworthiness defenses focus
on the defendant’s expressive project.  Adapting these defenses to in-
formation privacy law would represent a major legal innovation.  As
stated above, when the First Amendment and privacy protections con-
flict, courts currently look to categorize the information at issue in-
stead of examining the context in which that information is being
used.260  For the most part, this has resulted in First Amendment im-
munity for those using information others wish to keep private.261
The right of publicity’s focus on the defendant’s speech contribu-
tion offers a critical missing ingredient for addressing the constitu-
tionality of new information privacy laws.  Perhaps publicity rights
law has so much to offer in the data privacy context because of its own
origin as a type of quasi-privacy interest.262  By itself, merely catego-
rizing the plaintiff’s communication fails to engage with the real
harms of data privacy.  Similarly, exclusive or undue emphasis on the
defendant’s mental state could lead to unpredictable results, poten-
tially immunizing virtually all third-party data usage from regulation.
Although analyses of speech categories and speaker intent have their
place in reconciling privacy with free expression, the transformation
and newsworthiness tests offer a much-needed additional component
to any such reconciliation.  The tests provide a richer, normative
framework for courts that allows for consideration of important, yet
258. Messenger ex rel. Messenger v. Gruner Jahr Printing & Publ’g, 727 N.E.2d 549,
552 (N.Y. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
259. Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639, 642, 643 n.2 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1995).
260. See supra Part III.B.
261. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
262. See Mark Bartholomew, A Right is Born: Celebrity, Property, and Postmodern
Lawmaking, 44 CONN. L. REV. 301, 309–11 (2011).
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heretofore neglected, interests.  In short, they present a better oppor-
tunity for balance.
The transformativeness and newsworthiness tests have two partic-
ular qualities that recommend their application in the data-privacy
context.  The first is their track record of actually balancing free
speech concerns with other societal interests, instead of simply de-
manding an overriding deference to the First Amendment.  One criti-
cism of existing privacy torts is that they are conceptualized at a level
of individual injury.263  As a result, any court weighing that individ-
ual injury against the broader societal interest in free speech will al-
ways find the latter more compelling.264  Commentators argue that
this has unfairly doomed the privacy torts to failure.265  For example,
the common law tort for revealing private facts has largely been read
out of existence by courts concerned with safeguarding the expressive
output of the press.  A media defendant invoking the larger social in-
terest in free expression will always trump the single plaintiff com-
plaining about violation of her individual privacy.266
This has not been the case, however, with the publicity-rights tort.
In determining whether the newsworthiness defense is satisfied,
courts have noted potential consequences not only for audiences for
celebrity speech but also to the incentives necessary for creative
presences like actors and musicians to function.  Rather than simply
asking if the defendant’s expression is “news,” the courts undertake a
larger inquiry into whether the defendant’s use of the celebrity per-
sona represents a real counterpoint to the celebrity voice.  Hence, the
newsworthiness defense has been upheld when the speech at issue
represents some sort of news reporting267 or “editorial opinion,”268 but
it has been disallowed when the defendant’s expression was designed
to sell rather than inform.269
Second, by focusing on the defendant’s speech contribution, the
transformativeness and newsworthiness defenses allow for the consid-
eration of multiple normative frames, including the autonomy inter-
ests of both listeners and speakers and the fairness concerns of
consumers.  Some have noted that the Sorrell decision is rooted in a
single First Amendment perspective—one that views the market for
263. See Richards, supra note 28, at 1155.
264. See id.
265. West, supra note 47, at 628.
266. Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren & Bran-
deis’s Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291 (1983).
267. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 309–10 (9th Cir.
1992).
268. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1185–86 (9th Cir. 2001).
269. Fraley v. Facebook, 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 805 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
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online speech as controlled by equally autonomous actors.270  Under
what Shubha Ghosh labels the “classic liberal perspective,” the Sorrell
Court viewed doctors, pharmaceutical marketers, and consumers as
all equally capable of making informed decisions regardless of the
marketers’ ability to use prescribing information to generate individu-
ally tailored commercial appeals.  Under the liberal perspective, data-
collecting businesses pose no threat to consumers because government
actors can alert consumers to undesirable data collection practices,
and consumers can simply opt out of such practices.  As a result, there
is little need for legal safeguards against data collection and use.
In contrast to the Court’s approach in Sorrell, in applying the
transformativeness test, courts have demonstrated a nuanced recogni-
tion of the tradeoffs between free speech and other social interests.
The expansive nature of the transformativeness test has encouraged
courts to engage with free speech issues on multiple normative fronts.
Rather than being limited to the liberal perspective, another First
Amendment perspective, personal autonomy, is front and center in
these discussions.  For example, in evaluating the “transformative-
ness” of an unauthorized painting of Tiger Woods, the Sixth Circuit
noted not only the First Amendment’s goal of advancing knowledge
through “a free marketplace of ideas,” but also its “fulfillment of the
human need for self-expression,” an autonomy interest.271  Similarly,
when a federal court recently had to determine the duration of public-
ity rights under New Jersey common law, a decision with direct impli-
cations for free speech, it noted that one of the rationales for
recognizing a right of publicity remains its protection of “an individ-
ual’s interest in personal dignity and autonomy.”272  The plaintiff was
the purported beneficiary of Albert Einstein’s publicity rights under
his will.273  The defendant, an advertiser that used Einstein’s image
without permission, contended that whatever rights the beneficiary
held, they were no longer valid since Einstein had been dead for more
than fifty years.274  Ultimately, the court denied the plaintiff’s request
for a right of longer duration, explaining that “the personal interest
that is at stake becomes attenuated after the personality dies.”275
Hence, the court adopted an autonomy perspective, calibrating the
temporal length of the right according to one’s personal interest in
self-fulfillment.
270. Ghosh, supra note 79, at 705–06; Tamara R. Piety, “A Necessary Cost of Free-
dom”? The Incoherence of Sorrell v. IMS, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1, 5 (2012).
271. ETW Corp v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 955 (6th Cir. 2003).
272. Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem v. Gen. Motors, 903 F. Supp. 2d 932, 937 (C.D. Cal.
2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
273. Id. at 933.
274. Id. at 941.
275. Id. at 937.
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Courts have also evaluated the free speech/publicity rights balance
from a fairness perspective, assessing the power dynamics of the dif-
ferent speakers and audiences involved.  The Sorrell decision sug-
gested that the only remedy for problematic speech (like
individualized marketing based on pharmacy prescription data) is
more speech, regardless of the costs to patients, prescribing doctors, or
the Vermont health care system.276  The right of publicity’s trans-
formativeness test does not assume, however, that more speech is a
cure all for any speech with socially deleterious consequences.  In-
stead, it asks whether the speaker is truly making an expressive con-
tribution.  If not, the speaker loses First Amendment protection
because it is not actually providing a competing voice.  For example,
when the Tenth Circuit had to decide whether right-of-publicity
claims brought by major league baseball players for the unauthorized
use of their names and likenesses on parody baseball cards should
yield to the First Amendment, it determined whether the cards were
transformative.277  In doing so, it considered the effect of its decision
on the allocation of societal resources.278  Only after assuring itself
that the supply of celebrity images for public discourse would remain
robust, even after the defendant’s unauthorized uses were allowed,
did the court uphold the defendant’s First Amendment defense.279
Relatedly, the “newsworthiness” defense responds to “fairness”
concerns by allowing the press, in some circumstances, to balance out
the communicative abilities of celebrities with a countervailing force.
In assessing newsworthiness, courts indirectly inquire into fairness by
asking whether the defendant’s expression “concerns a matter of pub-
lic interest” and is “informative.”280  Newsworthy speech can be
viewed as speech that potentially counters already established voices
in the communicative marketplace.  For example, judges show special
solicitude for unauthorized use of celebrity press conferences or inter-
views, reasoning that the media serves an important function in dis-
seminating information that the persona at issue would like to restrict
or at least manage differently.281
So how might the more balanced and defendant-focused approach
to free speech concerns described above look in practice if applied to
current initiatives to regulate online privacy?  Some proposed “Do Not
276. See Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2671 (2011).
277. Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 970 (1996).
278. Id. at 272.
279. Id. at 974–75.
280. Davis v. Electronic Arts, Inc., No. 10-03328 RS, 2012 WL 3860819, at *6–*7 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 29, 2012); Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., 15 Cal. App. 4th 536, 543–44
(1993).
281. See, e.g., Cher v. Forum Int’l, Ltd., 692 F.2d 634, 637 (9th Cir. 1982); Falwell v.
Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 521 F. Supp. 1204, 1210 (W.D. Va. 1981); Current Audio,
Inc. v. RCA Corp., 337 N.Y.S.2d 949, 953–55 (Sup. 1972).
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Track” legislation would restrict the use of online search histories to
create targeted advertisements.282  Despite the apparent constitution-
ality of a “Do Not Call” registry,283 a law limiting online advertising
would definitely raise free speech concerns.284  Other “Do Not Track”
provisions limit the collection of information about a person’s online
activities.285  This could produce free speech challenges, as well.286  A
full description of how to evaluate the constitutionality of all pending
data-privacy legislation is beyond the scope of this Article.  Below is
an initial sketch of a better, more balanced scheme, relying on the
three approaches employed in intellectual property law and using po-
tential “Do Not Track” legislation as its chief example.
In a preliminary analysis of new data-privacy laws, a court should
consider the first two approaches discussed in this Article—categori-
zation of the data at issue and evaluation of the data collector’s intent.
Using these two approaches, courts should find some legislation
prohibiting data collection and tracking uncontroversial.  Certain data
subject matters (financial information, health records) are already
likely to be deemed “sensitive” and weighty enough to survive a First
Amendment challenge.  Similarly, proof of intent to defraud data sub-
jects should render any free speech appeals null.  Further, constitu-
tional analysis would not be required.
Most cases will not involve such extreme examples.  Instead, most
online data use involves everyday, nonsensitive information, and most
data collectors specify their collection practices in opaque terms of ser-
vice rather than engaging in out and out fraud.  Hence, additional
First Amendment review will be needed.  It should not be enough,
however, to determine that the data collection at issue in these situa-
tions is “speech.”  This was the move suggested by the Court in Sor-
rell, and it gave overwhelming deference to the expressive rights of
data users and short shrift to both state and consumer interests.
Rather than automatically validating the free speech interests of data
miners and online advertisers because the information they collect
seems less than sensitive and they do not act in “bad faith,” a court
interrogating “Do Not Track” or another kind of data-privacy law
should note the commercial motive behind such data collection and
further review the law under an intermediate level of scrutiny.
282. Peter Swire, Social Networks, Privacy, and Freedom of Association: Data Protec-
tion vs. Data Empowerment, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1371, 1400–02 (2012).
283. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC, 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004).
284. Rosen, supra note 14, at 88; Swire, supra note 282, at 1400–01.
285. See Julie Brill, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Keynote Address at the Interna-
tional Association of Privacy Professionals Second Annual Conference: The FTC
and Consumer Privacy Protection (Dec. 7, 2010), available at www.ftc.gov/
speeches/brill/101207iapp.pdf.
286. Swire, supra note 282, at 1400–02.
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The court should then examine how the data will be used by de-
fendants, paying special attention to autonomy and fairness concerns.
Autonomy concerns should rate low in a court’s estimation of the free
speech interests of most commercial data users.  Rather than further-
ing a personal point of view, data mining is used simply to pinpoint
consumer interests in the hopes of finding a viable marketing target.
On the other hand, from the perspective of consumers, autonomy is
the main justification for a “Do Not Track” regime.  It prevents un-
wanted surveillance and revelations that are undesired and unin-
tended.  At the least, it allows consumers to choose just how their
personal information should be exposed to others and what the partic-
ular audience for that exposure should be.  Just as courts construing
the right of publicity have chosen to weigh the autonomy interests of
celebrities and downstream speakers in determining whether an un-
authorized use is transformative or newsworthy, a similar approach
should be undertaken with regard to tracking restrictions and free
speech arguments.
Fairness concerns also need to be part of the decision, even though
they were not considered in Sorrell.287  The newsworthiness defense
concerns itself with power imbalances.  Celebrity speakers wield im-
mense power over the dissemination of their personas in society.  A
privilege for newsworthy uses of those personas is an attempt to inject
a counterbalance to that power, making possible alternative and un-
controlled communications about public figures.  Under a fairness per-
spective, it is important to recognize that, without protections like “Do
Not Track,” consumers have little opportunity to shape how their per-
sonal information is used by others.  As discussed earlier, nonpartici-
pation or resort to contractual safeguards is not a realistic option for
those individuals seeking some protection from the efforts of online
data collectors.288
A focus on the defendant’s use of online data would not defeat all
First Amendment challenges to data privacy laws.  In some situations,
the data user’s autonomy interests may loom larger.  Scientific re-
search using collected individual data suggests greater autonomy con-
cerns on the part of data users, as such users seek to use aggregated
information to present important expressive content.  Although a long
way from practical implementation, technological innovations portend
potential ways to give consumers more control over their data disclo-
sures, regardless of the privacy policies of the Web sites they con-
sult.289  If such technologies take hold, the fairness calculation
between consumers and data collectors may need to be reconceived.
287. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667 (2011)
288. See supra Part II.C.
289. See, e.g., Malcolm Burnley, How to Protect Your Privacy Online, ATLANTIC, June
2013 (describing browser add-ons that display icons informing online users as to
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This speaks to a larger point about the need for an adaptable
method for calibrating information privacy with the First Amend-
ment.  “Transformativeness” and “newsworthiness” are broad con-
cepts.  Rather than this ambiguity being a detriment, it permits a
certain amount of flexibility as legal decision-makers respond to
greater knowledge of existing technology.  Whereas judges may once
have viewed simply creating an avatar based on a real-life celebrity as
transformative, this may no longer, by itself, represent a significant
expressive contribution and, hence, merit less speech protection.290
Similarly, uses of personal data that once seemed innovative may be-
come commonplace and, therefore, deserve less regulatory deference.
The key is to implement a richer framework for balancing information
privacy and free speech.  Otherwise, despite the significant harms
that can arise from data collection and use, First Amendment argu-
ments will always legitimate such behavior.  By borrowing from intel-
lectual property’s playbook, information privacy law can support a
constitutionally level playing field between consumers and commer-
cial actors.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is an inherent tension between the desire to keep informa-
tion private and the desire to share that information with others.  On-
line technology amplifies the clash between the two desires by both
allowing for more and more data to be compiled on individual consum-
ers and by making it easier for that data to be repackaged and commu-
nicated to others.  In figuring out how to resolve this tension, courts
and legislatures do not need to reinvent the wheel.  A similar tension
exists between the legal system’s award of rights in intangible cre-
ations to individual actors and the need for downstream actors to util-
ize those creations.  One side wants to hold on to information; the
other wants to broadcast it to others.  As a result, intellectual property
law has developed and refined a variety of approaches for addressing
free speech concerns.
One approach, best represented by copyright law, weighs free
speech interests by focusing on the subject matter of the plaintiff’s
communication.  Another offers defendants a variety of speech-protec-
how each Web site visited will treat their data); Drew Olanoff, Burn Note Comes
Back with a Vengeance, Aims to Protect Your Private Messages with New Mobile
Apps, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 26, 2013) (discussing concept of “ephemeral messag-
ing,” whereby emails, photos, and other shared data are automatically destroyed
after a set period of time), available at http://techcrunch.com/2013/03/26/burn-
note-comes-back-with-a-vengeance-aims-to-protect-your-private-messages-with-
new-mobile-apps/; Ryan Tate, Why Facebook Would Pay $3 Billion for Snapchat
(And Why It Shouldn’t), WIRED, Nov. 13, 2013 (discussing Snapchat and potential
difficulties in integrating it with Facebook).
290. See Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 166 n.39 (3d Cir. 2013).
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tive defenses that depend on whether the defendant acted under a
proscribed motivation.  A final approach evaluates the defendant’s ex-
pressive output.  Defenses for “transformativeness” and “newsworthi-
ness” examine the societal contribution offered by the defendant’s
speech, forcing courts to analyze the costs and benefits of the defen-
dant’s expression from a variety of perspectives.  These approaches for
accommodating free expression are not mutually exclusive.  Instead,
they can all be implemented to offer a richer framework for constitu-
tionally calibrating new data privacy laws.  Moreover, these ap-
proaches, when considered as a group, offer balance, something
lacking in the Sorrell decision and needed if courts are to uphold new
and necessary data-privacy measures.
